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ABSTRACT
On Black-Box Complexity and Adaptive, Universal
Composability of Cryptographic Tasks
Dana Dachman-Soled
Two main goals of modern cryptography are to identify the minimal assumptions necessary to
construct secure cryptographic primitives as well as to construct secure protocols in strong and
realistic adversarial models. In this thesis, we address both of these fundamental questions.
In the first part of this thesis, we present results on the black-box complexity of two basic
cryptographic primitives: non-malleable encryption and optimally-fair coin tossing. Black-box
reductions are reductions in which both the underlying primitive as well as the adversary are
accessed only in an input-output (or black-box) manner. Most known cryptographic reductions
are black-box. Moreover, black-box reductions are typically more efficient than non-black-box
reductions. Thus, the black-box complexity of cryptographic primitives is a meaningful and
important area of study which allows us to gain insight into the primitive.
We study the black box complexity of non-malleable encryption and optimally-fair coin tossing,
showing a positive result for the former and a negative one for the latter. Non-malleable encryption
is a strong security notion for public-key encryption, guaranteeing that it is impossible to ”maul”
a ciphertext of a message m into a ciphertext of a related message. This security guarantee is
essential for many applications such as auctions. We show how to transform, in a black-box manner,
any public-key encryption scheme satisfying a weak form of security, semantic security, to a scheme
satisfying non-malleability. Coin tossing is perhaps the most basic cryptographic primitive, allowing
two distrustful parties to flip a coin whose outcome is 0 or 1with probability 1=2. A fair coin tossing
protocol is one in which the outputted bit is unbiased, even in the case where one of the parties may
abort early. However, in the setting where parties may abort early, there is always a strategy for
one of the parties to impose bias of 
(1=r) in an r-round protocol. Thus, achieving bias of O(1=r)
in r rounds is optimal, and it was recently shown that optimally-fair coin tossing can be achieved
via a black-box reduction to oblivious transfer. We show that it cannot be achieved via a black-box
reduction to one-way function, unless the number of rounds is at least 
(n= logn), where n is the
input/output length of the one-way-function.
In the second part of this thesis, we present protocols for multiparty computation (MPC) in
the Universal Composability (UC) model that are secure against malicious, adaptive adversaries.
In the standard model, security is only guaranteed in a stand-alone setting; however, nothing is
guaranteed when multiple protocols are arbitrarily composed. In contrast, the UCmodel, introduced
by (Canetti, 2000), considers the execution of an unbounded number of concurrent protocols, in
an arbitrary, and adversarially controlled network environment. Another drawback of the standard
model is that the adversary must decide which parties to corrupt before the execution of the protocol
commences. A more realistic model allows the adversary to adaptively choose which parties to
corrupt based on its evolving view during the protocol. In our work we consider the the adaptive
UC model, which combines these two security requirements by allowing both arbitrary composition
of protocols and adaptive corruption of parties.
In our first result, we introduce an improved, efficient construction of non-committing
encryption (NCE) with optimal round complexity, from a weaker primitive we introduce called
trapdoor-simulatable public key encryption (PKE). NCE is a basic primitive necessary to construct
protocols secure under adaptive corruptions and in particular, is used to construct oblivious transfer
(OT) protocols secure against semi-honest, adaptive adversaries. Additionally, we show how to
realize trapdoor-simulatable PKE from hardness of factoring Blum integers, thus achieving the first
construction of NCE from hardness of factoring. In our second result, we present a compiler for
transforming an OT protocol secure against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary into one that is secure
against a malicious, adaptive adversary. Our compiler achieves security in the UC model, assuming
access to an ideal commitment functionality, and improves over previous work achieving the same
security guarantee in two ways: it uses black-box access to the underlying protocol and achieves a
constant multiplicative overhead in the round complexity. Combining our two results with the work
of (Ishai et al., 2008), we obtain the first black-box construction of UC and adaptively secure MPC
from trapdoor-simulatable PKE and the ideal commitment functionality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Is it possible for two parties who have never met to exchange messages over
a public channel while an eavesdropper learns nothing?
This intriguing question was first posed over 30 years ago by Diffie and Hellman. The task seems
impossible, and in an information-theoretic sense it is: A computationally unbounded eavesdropper
can learn just as much about the exchanged messages as the designated parties. However, if we
limit the computational powers of the parties and make strong computational hardness assumptions
such as ”factoring is hard” or ”discrete log is hard” then, surprisingly, the above task and a myriad
of other interesting tasks can be achieved.
Thus, the field of cryptography, as we know it today, relies on computational assumptions.
Whether an assumption is credible or not may be difficult to determine and may change over time.
Therefore, a main goal of the theoretical foundations of cryptography is to determine the minimal
assumptions necessary for a given cryptographic task.
Is it possible for mutually distrustful parties to jointly compute a function of
their inputs while revealing nothing more than the output?
Whether or not a cryptographic task is achievable depends on howwemodel adversaries and howwe
define security. For example, depending on our adversarial model and security definition, it is either
possible to achieve the task above under appropriate hardness assumptions, or it is unconditionally
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impossible to achieve. More specifically, in a model where the protocol runs in a standalone setting,
we can achieve the above task for any functionality, based on various computational hardness
assumptions. However, if we require the protocol to be secure in a setting where concurrent
executions are allowed, then it becomes impossible to compute most functionalities securely without
trusted setup. Thus, a second main goal of the theoretical foundations of cryptography is to construct
protocols that are secure in the most realistic models and against the strongest adversaries possible.
This thesis addresses these two broad goals by focusing on the following two topics: Investigat-
ing the black-box complexity of basic cryptographic primitives and constructing protocols that are
secure in the UC-model under adaptive corruptions. Studying black-box complexity is a first step in
determining minimal assumptions necessary for cryptographic tasks; the adaptive UC-model is one
of the strongest and most realistic models that have been proposed thus far for proving security of
cryptographic protocols.
1.1 Black-Box Complexity.
The study of the black-box complexity of a cryptographic primitive P involves determining the
relationship between primitive P and some other primitive Q by showing either a black-box
reduction from P to Q, or ruling out such a reduction. Black-box reductions are reductions
in which both the underlying primitive as well as the adversary are accessed only in an input-
output (or black-box) manner. The vast majority of known cryptographic reductions are black-
box (with a few notable exceptions [Feige et al., 1999; Dolev et al., 2000; Barak, 2001;
Barak, 2002]). Moreover, black-box reductions are typically more efficient than non-black-box
reductions since, in most cases (with the exception of the work of [Barak, 2001; Barak, 2002])
non-black-box reductions involve generic zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs. Such proofs tend to be
inefficient for two reasons: First, generic ZK proofs usually require Karp reductions to an NP-
complete problem such as Hamiltonian cycle, and although guaranteed to be polynomial-time, these
reductions can be highly inefficient. Second, if the statement of the proof involves the underlying
cryptographic primitive, as is the case in non-black-box usage, the size of ZK proof will depend
on the complexity of the underlying primitive. For example, consider proving in ZK that two
ciphertextsC1; C2 both encrypt the same messagem (we note that a very similar example will come
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up in the context of constructing non-malleable encryption schemes). The number of commitments
required in the ZK proof will be at least the size of the verification circuit, which in turn is at least
as large as the encryption circuit. For security parameter k, a typical encryption circuit has size
k3 ([Ishai et al., 2006]) and so for a typical setting of k = 1024 or k = 2048 the proof will need
to contain over 1 billion commitments. Clearly, this overhead is unsustainable in many practical
applications.
One of the main goals of modern cryptography has been to identify the minimal assumptions
necessary to construct secure cryptographic primitives. Understanding the black-box complexity of
cryptographic primitives is a meaningful step towards reaching this goal. In the positive case, in
which it is shown that there exists a black-box reduction from primitive Q to primitive P , we may
conclude that the minimal assumptions necessary for realizing P are also sufficient to achieve Q.
Searching specifically for black-box reductions is important since black-box constructions lead to
simpler and more efficient protocols that avoid the inefficiency of generic zero knowledge proofs.
In the negative case, in which it is proven that there exists no black-box reduction from primitive
Q to primitive P , we provide evidence that the minimal assumptions necessary for realizing Q are
stronger than the minimal assumptions necessary for realizing P . Indeed, the first work in this area
by Impagliazzo and Rudich ([Impagliazzo and Rudich, 1989]) proved that there is no black-box
reduction of key agreement (KA) to one-way function (OWF). Because of this result, it is widely
accepted by the community that achieving KA requires stronger hardness assumptions than OWF,
even though the result itself only rules out black-box reductions.
In this work we investigate the black box complexity of two basic cryptographic primitives,
non-malleable encryption and optimally-fair coin tossing, showing a positive result for the former
and a negative one for the latter. Non-malleable encryption is a strong security notion for public-
key encryption, guaranteeing that it is impossible to ”maul” a ciphertext of a message m into a
ciphertext of a related message. This security guarantee is essential for many applications such as
auctions. We show how to transform, in a black-box manner, any public-key encryption scheme
satisfying a weak form of security, semantic security, to a scheme satisfying non-malleability. Coin
tossing is perhaps the most basic cryptographic primitive, allowing two distrustful parties to flip a
coin whose outcome is 0 or 1 with probability 1=2. A fair coin tossing protocol is one in which the
outputted bit is unbiased, even in the case where one of the parties may abort early. However, in
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the setting where parties may abort early, it’s been long known that there is always a strategy for
one of the parties to impose bias of 
(1=r) in an r-round protocol. Thus, achieving bias of O(1=r)
in r rounds is optimal, and it was recently shown that optimally-fair coin tossing can be achieved
via a black-box reduction to oblivious transfer. We show that it cannot be achieved via a black-box
reduction to one-way function, unless the number of rounds is at least 
(n= logn), where n is the
input/output length of the one-way-function.
1.2 Adaptive UC-security.
In an overlapping theme, this work explores strong adversarial models and presents efficient,
provably secure protocols in these models. In the standard model, security is only guaranteed
in a stand-alone setting; however, nothing is guaranteed when multiple protocols are arbitrarily
composed. Thus, in today’s world of multiprogramming, proving security of protocols in the
stand-alone setting does not give us meaningful real-world guarantees. In contrast, the UC
(Univeral Composability) model, introduced by Canetti [Canetti, 2000], considers the execution of
an unbounded number of concurrent protocols, in an arbitrary, and adversarially controlled network
environment. Another drawback of the standard model is that the adversary must decide which
parties to corrupt before the execution of the protocol commences. A more realistic model allows
the adversary to adaptively choose which parties to corrupt based on its evolving view during the
protocol. In our work we consider the adaptive UC model, which combines these two security
requirements by allowing both arbitrary composition of protocols and adaptive corruption of parties.
We introduce an improved, more efficient construction of non-committing encryption (NCE).
NCE is a basic primitive that is necessary for proving security under adaptive corruptions.
Intuitively, NCE is a semantically secure public key encryption scheme with the added property
that a simulator playing the part of both the sender and receiver can generate encryptions that can
be opened later to either 0 or 1. NCE is necessary in the adaptive model even to realize the simplest
functionality of private bit transfer over public channels. In our work we present a construction of
NCE from a new, weaker primitive we introduce called trapdoor-simulatable public-key encryption
(PKE). Additionally, we show how to realize trapdoor-simulatable PKE from hardness of factoring
Blum integers, thus achieving the first construction of NCE from hardness of factoring. In addition
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to the private bit transfer functionality, NCE can be used to construct semi-honest oblivious transfer
(OT), as shown by [Canetti et al., 2002]. Building on this construction of semi-honest OT from
NCE, we next present a compiler for transforming an OT protocol secure against a semi-honest,
adaptive adversary into one that is secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary. Our compiler
achieves security in the UC model, assuming access to an ideal commitment functionality, and
improves over previous work achieving the same security guarantee in two ways: it uses black-
box access to the underlying protocol and achieves a constant multiplicative overhead in the round
complexity. Combining our two results with the work of [Ishai et al., 2008], we obtain the first
black-box construction of UC and adaptively secure MPC from trapdoor-simulatable PKE and the
ideal commitment functionality.
6Part I
Black-Box Complexity
7Much work in modern cryptography has been dedicated to understanding the relationships
between different primitives and notions of security. For example, [Yao, 1982; Goldwasser and
Micali, 1984; Rompel, 1990; Ha˚stad et al., 1999; Goldreich et al., 1986; Luby and Rackoff, 1988;
Impagliazzo and Luby, 1989; Naor and Yung, 1989; Naor, 1991] have shown that private key
encryption, pseudorandom generators, pseudorandom functions and permutations, bit commitment,
and digital signatures exist if and only if one-way functions exist. On the other hand, some
cryptographic primitives such as public key encryption, oblivious transfer, and key agreement are
not known to be equivalent to one way functions. Thus, it is natural to ask whether the existence
of one-way functions implies these primitives. However, it seems unclear how to formalize such a
question; since it is widely believed that both one-way functions and public key encryption exist, this
would imply in a trivial logical sense that the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of
public key encryption. Thus, we can only hope to rule out restricted types of constructions that are
commonly used to prove implications in cryptography. Impagliazzo and Rudich [Impagliazzo and
Rudich, 1989] were the first to develop a technique to rule out the existence of an important class of
reductions between primitives known as black-box reductions. Intuitively, this is a reduction where
the primitive is treated as an oracle or a “black-box”. There are actually several flavors of black-box
reductions (fully black-box, semi black-box and weakly black-box [Reingold et al., 2004]). In our
work, we only deal with fully black-box reductions, and so we will focus on this notion here.
Informally, a fully black-box reduction from a primitive Q to a primitive P is a pair of oracle
ppt Turing machines (G;S) such that the following two properties hold:
Correctness: For every implementation f of primitive P , g = Gf implements Q.
Security: For every implementation f of primitive P , and every adversary A, if A breaks Gf (as
an implementation of Q) then SA;f breaks f . (Thus, if f is “secure”, then so is Gf .)
Subsequently to the initial groundbreaking work of [Impagliazzo and Rudich, 1989], there
has been substantial work on proving the impossibility of black-box reductions between other
fundamental primitives. Such proofs are frequently called ”black-box separations” since they show
that one primitive is more powerful than the other with respect to the class of black-box reductions.
Some examples of these works are: A separation between one-way permutations and collision-
resistant hash functions [Simon, 1998], a separation between public key encryption (PKE) and
8oblivious transfer (OT) [Gertner et al., 2000], a separation between trapdoor predicates and trapdoor
functions [Gertner et al., 2001], a partial separation between semantically-secure encryption and
CCA-secure encryption [Gertner et al., 2007], as well as many other works.
Another related area of work has been to study the best possible efficiency of black-box
reductions and to show that any black-box construction of some primitiveQ from another primitive
P must make at least q queries to primitive P . Such questions have been studied in the works of
[Ko¨nig et al., 1999; Gennaro et al., 2005; Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary, 2007]. There are other
notions of efficiency that may be of interest as well such as round-efficiency and communication
complexity as studied in the works of [Haitner et al., 2007; Haitner et al., 2008].
A compelling question that arises from the above discussion is the following: are arbitrary
reductions more powerful than black-box reductions? Intuitively, it may seem that non-black-box
access to the code of an adversary does not give any practical advantage over input/output access
since we know that ”backward engineering” the code of the adversary is a hard problem. For
example, if the code of the adversary is ”obfuscated” then, by definition, having access to the
code provides no advantage over having only input/output access to the adversary. However, in
a groundbreaking result, [Barak, 2001] showed that this intuition is false: For specific primitives
P and Q, there exists a reduction from Q to P where the simulator accesses the code of the
adversaryA, while such a reduction provably does not exist in the case where the simulator accesses
the adversary A only in a black-box manner. Still, even in the context of the work of [Barak,
2001], the reduction always accesses the underlying primitive P in a black-box manner and only
requires access to the code of the adversary, A. This raises the question of whether reductions
of cryptographic task Q to primitive P that access the code of P but not the code of A are more
powerful than reductions that are black-box in both P and A. In the past several years, there has
been significant progress towards answering this question. It has been shown in multiple cases how
to achieve fully-black-box constructions where previously all known constructions required non-
black-box access to the underlying primitive (c.f. [Ishai et al., 2006; Haitner, 2008; Choi et al., 2008;
Choi et al., 2009b; Ishai et al., 2008; Lindell and Pinkas, 2007]), and where previously non-black-
box access was believed to be essential. In our work, we continue this line of research by presenting
a black-box construction of non-malleable encryption from any semantically-secure encryption.
Previously, all known constructions required non-black-box access to the underlying semantically-
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We also study the minimal assumptions necessary for optimally-fair coin-tossing. In the
standard notion of security, ”fairness” is not guaranteed: Namely, if one of the parties aborts
early, perhaps after receiving output, nothing is guaranteed about the correctness of the output of
the remaining party. Recently, the problem of fairness in computation has come to the forefront
with the exciting works of [Gordon et al., 2008; Gordon and Katz, 2009; Moran et al., 2009;
Gordon and Katz, 2010] after almost no progress in this area for over 20 years. Since coin-tossing
is a foundational cryptographic primitive with widespread use in multiparty computation protocols,
better understanding of the black-box complexity of coin-tossing is necessary to determine the
possibilities and limitations of fairness in secure multiparty computation.
A fair two-party coin-tossing protocol is one in which both parties output the same bit that
is almost uniformly distributed. Unfortunately, Cleve [Cleve, 1986] showed that for every coin-
tossing protocol with r rounds, an efficient fail-stop adversary (adversary that behaves honestly but
may choose to abort the protocol at any point) can bias the output by 
(1=r). Since this is the best
possible, a protocol that limits the bias of any adversary to O(1=r) is called optimally-fair. The
only known optimally-fair coin-tossing protocol (introduced recently by Moran et al. [Moran et
al., 2009]) relies on the existence of oblivious transfer (OT). However, it is possible to use Blum’s
protocol [Blum, 1981] to achieve a bias of O(1=
p
r) in r rounds relying only on the assumption
that one-way functions (OWF) exist [Cleve, 1986].
In this work we address the question of whether it is possible to achieve a bias of o(1=
p
r) in
r rounds relying only on the assumption that OWF exist. We show that it is impossible to achieve
coin-tossing with bias o(1=
p
r) via a black-box reduction to OWF for r that is less thanO(n= log n),
where n is the input/output length of the OWF. However, the [Moran et al., 2009] protocol based
on OT achieves bias of O(1=r) even for r less than O(n= log n). Thus, our work gives the first
evidence that the assumptions needed for optimally-fair coin-tossing are stronger than those needed
for unfair coin-tossing.
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Chapter 2
Black-Box Construction of a
Non-Malleable Encryption Scheme from
any Semantically-Secure One
2.1 Introduction
The most basic security guarantee we require of a public key encryption scheme is that of semantic
security [Goldwasser and Micali, 1984]: it is infeasible to learn anything about the plaintext from
the ciphertext. In many cryptographic applications such as auctions, we would like an encryption
scheme that satisfies the stronger guarantee of non-malleability [Dolev et al., 2000], namely that
given some ciphertext c, it is also infeasible to generate ciphertexts of some message that is
related to the decryption of c. Motivated by the importance of non-malleability, Pass, Shelat and
Vaikuntanathan raised the following question [Pass et al., 2006]:
It is possible to immunize any semantically secure encryption scheme against malleabil-
ity attacks?
Pass et al. gave a beautiful construction of a non-malleable encryption scheme from any
semantically secure one (building on [Dolev et al., 2000]), thereby addressing the question in
the affirmative. However, the PSV construction – as with previous constructions achieving non-
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malleability from general assumptions [Dolev et al., 2000; Sahai, 1999; Lindell, 2006] – suffers
from the curse of inefficiency arising from the use of general NP-reductions. In this work, we
show that we can in fact immunize any semantically secure encryption schemes against malleability
attacks without paying the price of general NP-reductions:
Main theorem (informal) There exists a (fully) black-box construction of a non-
malleable encryption scheme from any semantically secure one.
That is, we provide a wrapper program (from programming language lingo) that given any
subroutines for computing a semantically secure encryption scheme, computes a non-malleable
encryption scheme, with a multiplicative overhead in the running time that is quasi-linear in the
security parameter. Before providing further details, let us first provide some background and
context for our result.
2.1.1 Relationships amongst Cryptographic Primitives
Much of the modern work in foundations of cryptography rests on general cryptographic assump-
tions like the existence of one-way functions and trapdoor permutations. General assumptions
provide an abstraction of the functionalities and hardness we exploit in specific assumptions such
as hardness of factoring and discrete log without referring to any specific underlying algebraic
structure. Constructions based on general assumptions may use the primitive guaranteed by the
assumption in one of two ways:
Black-box usage: A construction is black-box if it refers only to the input/output behavior of
the underlying primitive; we would typically also require that in the proof of security, we
can use an adversary breaking the security of the construction as an oracle to break the
underlying primitive. (See [Reingold et al., 2004] and references within for more details.).
As emphasized earlier, our construction is black-box, using only oracle access to the key
generation, encryption and decryption functionality of the underlying encryption scheme.
Non-black-box usage: A construction is non-black-box if it uses the code computing the func-
tionality of the primitive. The PSV construction along with the work it builds on fall into
this category: they use an NP reduction applied to the circuit computing the encryption
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functionality of the underlying encryption scheme in order to provide a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof of consistency.
Motivated by the fact that the vast majority of constructions in cryptography are black-box, a rich
and fruitful body of work initiated in [Impagliazzo and Rudich, 1989] seeks to understand the power
and limitations of black-box constructions in cryptography, resulting in a fairly complete picture of
the relations amongst most cryptographic primitives with respect to black-box constructions (we
summarize several of the known relations pertaining to encryption in Figure 2.1). More recent work
has turned to tasks for which the only constructions we have are non-black-box, yet the existence
of a black-box construction is not ruled out. Two notable examples are general secure multi-party
computation against a dishonest majority and encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext (CCA2) attacks1 (c.f. [Goldreich et al., 1988; Dolev et al., 2000]).
The general question of whether we can securely realize these tasks via black-box access to a
general primitive is not merely of theoretical interest. A practical reason is related to efficiency,
as non-black-box constructions tend to be less efficient due to the use of general NP reductions to
order to prove statements in zero knowledge; this impacts both computational complexity as well
as communication complexity (which we interpret broadly to mean message lengths for protocols
and key size and ciphertext size for encryption schemes). Moreover, if resolved in the affirmative,
we expect the solution to provide new insights and techniques for circumventing the use of NP
reductions and zero knowledge in the known constructions. Finally, given that there has been no
formal model that captures non-black-box constructions in a satisfactory manner, the pursuit of a
positive result becomes all the more interesting.
Indeed, Ishai et al. [Ishai et al., 2006] recently provided an affirmative answer for secure multi-
party computation by exhibiting black-box constructions from some low-level primitive. Their
techniques have since been used to yield secure multi-party computation via black-box access to
an oblivious transfer protocol for semi-honest parties, which is complete (and thus necessary) for
secure multi-party computation [Haitner, 2008]. This leaves the following open problem:
Is it possible to realize CCA2-secure encryption via black-box access to a low-level
1These are encryption schemes that remain semantically secure even under a CCA2 attack, wherein the adversary is
allowed to query the decryption oracle except on the given challenge. A CCA1 attack is one wherein the adversary is
allowed to query the decryption oracle before (but not after) seeing the challenge.
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primitive, e.g. enhanced trapdoor permutations or homomorphic encryption schemes?
Previous work pertaining to this problem is limited to non-black-box constructions of CCA2-secure
encryption from enhanced trapdoor permutations [Dolev et al., 2000; Sahai, 1999; Lindell, 2006];
nothing is known assuming homomorphic encryption schemes. In work concurrent with ours,
Peikert and Waters [Peikert and Waters, 2008] made substantial progress towards the open problem
– they constructed CCA2-secure encryption schemes via black-box access to a new primitive they
introduced called lossy trapdoor functions, and in addition, gave constructions of this primitive
from number-theoretic and worst-case lattice assumptions. Unfortunately, they do not provide a
black-box construction of CCA2-secure encryption from enhanced trapdoor permutations.
Our work may also be viewed as a step towards closing this remaining gap (and a small
step in the more general research agenda of understanding the power of black-box constructions).
Specifically, the security guarantee provided by non-malleability lies between semantic security
and CCA2 security, and we show how to derive non-malleability in a black-box manner from
the minimal assumption possible, i.e., semantic security. In the process, we show how to enforce
consistency of ciphertexts in a black-box manner. This issue arises in black-box constructions of
both CCA2-secure and non-malleable encryptions. However, our consistency checks only satisfy
a weaker notion of non-adaptive soundness, which is sufficient for non-malleability but not for
CCA2-security (c.f. [Pass et al., 2006]). As a special case of our result, we obtain a black-box
construction of non-malleable encryptions from any (poly-to-1) trapdoor function. Our results are
incomparable with those of Peikert and Waters since we start from weaker assumptions but derive a
weaker security guarantee.
Related positive results.
A different line of work focuses on (very) efficient constructions of CCA2-secure encryptions under
specific number-theoretic assumptions [Cramer and Shoup, 1998; Cramer and Shoup, 2004; Canetti
et al., 2004]. Apart from those based on identity-based encryption, these constructions together
with previous ones based on general assumptions can be described under the following framework
(c.f. [Blum et al., 1988; Naor and Yung, 1990; Rackoff and Simon, 1991; Elkind and Sahai, 2002]).
Start with some cryptographic hardness assumption that allows us to build a semantically secure
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IND-CPA
NM-CPAIND-CCA1
IND-CCA2
NM-q-CCA2
IND-q-CCA2
eTDP lossy TDF
(poly-to-1) TDF
Solid lines indicate black box constructions, and dotted lines indicate non-black-
box constructions. The separations are with respect to black-box reductions, or
black box shielding reductions. Our contributions are indicated with the thick
arrows.
Figure 2.1: Relations among generic encryption primitives
encryption scheme, and then prove/verify that several ciphertexts satisfy certain relations in one of
two ways:
 exploiting algebraic relations from the underlying assumption to deduce additional structure
in the encryption scheme (e.g. homomorphic, reusing randomness) [Cramer and Shoup, 1998;
Cramer and Shoup, 2004];
 apply a general NP reduction to prove in non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) statements
that relate to the primitive [Dolev et al., 2000; Sahai, 1999; Lindell, 2006].
None of the previous approaches seems to yield black-box constructions under general assumptions.
Indeed, our work (also [Peikert and Waters, 2008]) does not use the above framework.
2.1.2 Our Results
As mentioned earlier, we exhibit a black-box construction of a non-malleable encryption scheme
from any semantically secure one, the main novelty being that our construction is black-box. While
this is interesting in and of itself, our construction also compares favorably with previous work in
several regards:
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 Improved parameters. We improve on the computational complexity of previous construc-
tions based on general assumptions. In particular, we do not have to do an NP-reduction
in either encryption or decryption, although we do have to pay the price of the running
time of Berlekamp-Welch for decryption. The running time incurs a multiplicative overhead
that is quasi-linear in the security parameter, over the running time of the underlying CPA
secure scheme. Moreover, the sizes of public keys and ciphertext are independent of the
computational complexity of the underlying scheme.
 Conceptual simplicity/clarity. Our scheme (and the analysis) is arguably much simpler than
many of the previous constructions, and like [Pass et al., 2006], entirely self-contained
(apart from the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm). We do not need to appeal to notions of zero-
knowledge, nor do we touch upon subtle technicalities like adaptive vs non-adaptive NIZK.
Our construction may be covered in an introductory graduate course on cryptography without
requiring zero knowledge as a pre-requisite.
 Ease of implementation. Our scheme is easy to describe and can be easily implemented in a
modular fashion.
We may also derive from our construction additional positive and negative results.
Bounded CCA2 non-malleability.
Cramer et al. [Cramer et al., 2007] introduced the bounded CCA2 attack, a relaxation of the CCA2
attack wherein the adversary is only allowed make an a-priori bounded number of queries q to the
decryption oracle, where q is fixed prior to choosing the parameters of the encryption scheme. In
addition, starting from any semantically secure encryption, they obtained2:
 an encryption scheme that is semantically secure under a bounded-CCA2 attack via a black-
box construction, wherein the size of the public key and ciphertext are quadratic in q; and
 an encryption scheme that is non-malleable under a bounded-CCA2 attack via a non-black-
box construction, wherein the size of the public key and ciphertext are linear in q.
2While semantic security and non-malleability are equivalent under a CCA2 attack [Dolev et al., 2000], they are not
equivalent under a bounded-CCA2 attack, as shown in [Cramer et al., 2007].
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Combining their approach for the latter construction with our main result, we obtain an encryption
scheme that is non-malleable under a bounded-CCA2 attack via a black-box construction, wherein
the size of the public key and ciphertext are linear in q.
Separation between CCA2 security and non-malleability.
Our main construction has the additional property that the decryption algorithm does not query
the encryption functionality of the underlying scheme. Gertner, Malkin and Myers [Gertner et
al., 2007] referred to such constructions as shielding and they showed that there is no shielding
black-box construction of CCA1-secure encryption schemes from semantically secure encryption.
Combined with the fact that any shielding construction when composed with our construction is
again shielding, this immediately yields the following:
Corollary (informal) There exists no shielding black-box construction of CCA1-
secure encryption schemes from non-malleable encryption schemes.
Note that a CCA2-secure encryption scheme is trivially also CCA1-secure, so this also implies a
separation between non-malleability and CCA2-security for shielding black-box constructions.
Our techniques.
At a high level, we follow the cut-and-choose approach for consistency checks from [Pass et al.,
2006], wherein the randomness used for cut-and-choose is specified in the secret key. A crucial
component of our construction is a message encoding scheme with certain locally testable and self-
correcting properties, based on the fact that low-degree polynomials are simultaneously good error-
correcting codes and a secret-sharing scheme; this has been exploited in the early work on secure
multi-party computation with malicious adversaries [Ben-Or et al., 1988]. We think this technique
may be useful in eliminating general NP-reductions in other constructions in cryptography (outside
of public-key encryption).
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Towards CCA2 Security?
The main obstacle towards achieving full CCA2 security from either semantically secure encryp-
tions or enhanced trapdoor permutations using our approach (and also the [Pass et al., 2006]
approach) lies in guaranteeing soundness of the consistency checks against an adversary that can
adaptively determine its queries depending on the outcome of previous consistency checks. It seems
conceivable that using a non-shielding construction that uses re-encryption may help overcome this
obstacle.
2.1.3 Overview of our Construction
Recall the DDN [Dolev et al., 2000] and PSV [Pass et al., 2006] constructions: to encrypt a message,
one (a) generates k encryptions of the same message under independent keys, (b) gives a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof that all resulting ciphertexts are encryptions of the same message,
and (c) signs the entire bundle with a one-time signature. It is in step (b) that we use a general
NP-reduction, which in return makes the construction non-black-box. In the proof of security, we
exploit that fact that for a well-formed ciphertext, we can recover the message if we know the secret
key for any of the k encryptions.
How do we guarantee that a tuple of k ciphertexts are encryptions of the same plaintext
without using a zero-knowledge proof and without revealing any information about the underlying
plaintext? Naively, one would like to use a cut-and-choose approach (as has been previously used
in [Lindell and Pinkas, 2007] to eliminate zero-knowledge proofs in the context of secure two-party
computation), namely decrypt and verify that some constant fraction, say k=2 of the ciphertexts are
indeed consistent. There are two issues with this approach:
 First, if only a constant number of ciphertexts are inconsistent, then we are unlikely to detect
the inconsistency. To circumvent this problem, we could decrypt by outputting the majority
of the remaining k=2 ciphertexts.
 The second issue is more fundamental: decrypting any of the ciphertexts will immediately
reveal the underlying message, whereas it is crucial that we can enforce consistency while
learning nothing about the underlying message.
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We circumvent both issues by using a more sophisticated encoding of the messagem based on
low-degree polynomials instead of merely making k copies of the message as in the above schemes.
Specifically, we pick a random degree k polynomial p such that p(0) = m and we construct a
k  10k matrix such that the i’th column of the matrix comprises entirely of the value p(i). To
verify consistency, we will decrypt a random subset of k columns, and check that all the entries in
each of these columns are the same.
 The issue that only a tiny number of ciphertexts are inconsistent is handled using the error-
correcting properties of low-degree polynomials; specifically, each row of a valid encoding is
a codeword for the Reed-Solomon code (and we output ? if it’s far from any codeword).
 Low-degree polynomials are also good secret-sharing schemes, and learning a random subset
of k columns in a valid encoding reveals nothing about the underlying messagem. Encoding
m using a secret-sharing scheme appears in the earlier work of Cramer et al. [Cramer et al.,
2007], but they do not consider redundancy or error-correction.
As before, we encrypt all the entries of the matrix using independent keys and then sign the entire
bundle with a one-time signature. It is important that the encoding also provides a robustness
guarantee similar to that of repeating the message k times: we are able to recover the message
for a valid encryption if we can decrypt any row in the matrix. Indeed, this is essentially our entire
scheme with two technical caveats:
 As with previous schemes, we will associate one pair of public/secret key pairs with each
entry of the matrix, and we will select the public key for encryption based on the verification
key of the one-time signature scheme.
 To enforce consistency, we will need a codeword check in addition to the column check
outlined above. The reason for this is fairly subtle and we will highlight the issue in the
formal exposition of our construction.
Decreasing ciphertext size. To encrypt an n-bit message with security parameter k, our
construction yields O(k2) encryptions of n-bit messages in the underlying scheme. It is easy to
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see that this may be reduced to O(k log2 k) encryptions by reducing the number of columns to
O(log2 k).
2.1.4 Follow-up work
The encoding scheme introduced here has been used in a number of follow-up works: a black-box
construction of set intersection protocols from homomorphic encryption [Dachman-Soled et al.,
2009], and a black-box construction of a CCA2-secure encryption scheme for strings starting from
one for bits [Myers and Shelat, 2009].
2.2 Preliminaries & Definitions
Notation.
We adopt the notation used in [Pass et al., 2006]. We use [n] to denote f1; 2; : : : ; ng. If A is
a probabilistic polynomial time (hereafter, ppt) algorithm that runs on input x, A(x) denotes the
random variable according to the distribution of the output of A on input x. We denote by A(x; r)
the output of A on input x and random coins r. Computational indistinguishability between two
distributions A and B is denoted by A
c B and statistical indistinguishability by A s B.
2.2.1 Semantically Secure Encryption
Definition 2.2.1 (Encryption Scheme) A triple (Gen;Enc;Dec) is an encryption scheme, if Gen
and Enc are ppt algorithms and Dec is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm which satisfies
the following property:
Correctness. There exists a negligible function () such that for all sufficiently large
k, we have that with probability 1   (k) over (PK; SK)  Gen(1k): for all m,
Pr[DecSK(EncPK(m)) = m] = 1.
Definition 2.2.2 (Semantic Security) Let  = (Gen;Enc;Dec) be an encryption scheme and let
the random variable INDb(;A; k), where b 2 f0; 1g, A = (A1;A2) are ppt algorithms and
k 2 N, denote the result of the following probabilistic experiment:
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INDb(;A; k) :
(PK; SK) Gen(1k)
(m0;m1; STATEA) A1(PK) s.t. jm0j = jm1j
y  EncPK(mb)
D  A2(y; STATEA)
Output D
(Gen;Enc;Dec) is indistinguishable under a chosen-plaintext (CPA) attack, or semantically secure,
if for any ppt algorithms A = (A1;A2) the following two ensembles are computationally
indistinguishable: n
IND0(;A; k)
o
k2N
c
n
IND1(;A; k)
o
k2N
It follows from a straight-forward hybrid argument that semantic security implies indistinguishabil-
ity of multiple encryptions under independently chosen keys:
Proposition 2.2.3 Let  = (Gen;Enc;Dec) be a semantically secure encryption scheme and let
the random variable mINDb(;A; k; `), where b 2 f0; 1g, A = (A1;A2) are ppt algorithms and
k 2 N, denote the result of the following probabilistic experiment:
mINDb(;A; k; `) :
For i = 1; : : : ; `: (PKi; SKi) Gen(1k)
(hm10; : : : ;m`0i; hm11; : : : ;m`1i; STATEA) A1(hPK1; : : : ; PK`i)
s.t. jm10j = jm11j =    = jm`0j = jm`1j
For i = 1; : : : ; `: yi  EncPKi(mib)
D  A2(y1; : : : ; y`; STATEA)
Output D
then for any ppt algorithmsA = (A1;A2) and for any polynomial p(k) the following two ensembles
are computationally indistinguishable:
n
mIND0(;A; k; p(k))
o
k2N
c
n
mIND1(;A; k; p(k))
o
k2N
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2.2.2 Non-malleable Encryption
Definition 2.2.4 (Non-malleable Encryption [Pass et al., 2006]) Let  = (Gen;Enc;Dec) be an
encryption scheme and let the random variable NMEb(;A; k; `) where b 2 f0; 1g, A = (A1;A2)
are ppt algorithms and k; ` 2 N denote the result of the following probabilistic experiment:
NMEb(;A; k; `) :
(PK; SK) Gen(1k)
(m0;m1; STATEA) A1(PK) s.t. jm0j = jm1j
y  EncPK(mb)
( 1; : : : ;  `) A2(y; STATEA)
Output (d1; : : : ; d`) where di =
8><>:
? if  i = y
DecSK( i) otherwise
(Gen;Enc;Dec) is non-malleable under a chosen plaintext (CPA) attack if for any ppt algorithms
A = (A1;A2) and for any polynomial p(k), the following two ensembles are computationally
indistinguishable:
n
NME0(;A; k; p(k))
o
k2N
c
n
NME1(;A; k; p(k))
o
k2N
It was shown in [Pass et al., 2006] that an encryption that is non-malleable (under Defini-
tion 2.2.4) remains non-malleable even if the adversaryA2 receives several encryptions under many
different public keys (the formal experiment is the analogue of mIND for non-malleability).
2.2.3 (Strong) One-Time Signature Schemes
Informally, a (strong) one-time signature scheme (GenSig;Sign;VerSig) is an existentially unforge-
able signature scheme, with the restriction that the signer signs at most one message with any key.
This means that an efficient adversary, upon seeing a signature on a messagem of his choice, cannot
generate a valid signature on a different message, or a different valid signature on the same message
m. Such schemes can be constructed in a black-box way from one-way functions [Rompel, 1990;
Lamport, 1979], and thus from any semantically secure encryption scheme (Gen;Enc;Dec) using
black-box access only to Gen.
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2.3 Construction
Given an encryption scheme E = (Gen;Enc;Dec), we construct a new encryption scheme  =
(NMGenGen;NMEncGen;Enc;NMDecGen;Dec), summarized in Figure 4.2, and described as follows.
Polynomial encoding. We identify f0; 1gn with the field GF(2n). To encode a message m 2
f0; 1gn, we pick a random degree k polynomial p over GF(2n) such that p(0) = m and construct
a k  10k matrix such that the i’th column of the matrix comprise entirely of the value si = p(i)
(where 0; 1; : : : ; 10k are the lexicographically first 10k + 1 elements in GF(2n) according to some
canonical encoding). Note that (s1; : : : ; s10k) is both a (k+1)-out-of-10k secret-sharing ofm using
Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme and a codeword of the Reed-Solomon codeW , where
W = f (p(1); : : : ; p(10k) j p is a degree k polynomial g:
Note thatW is a code over the alphabet f0; 1gn with minimum relative distance 0:9, which means
we may efficiently correct up to 0:45 fraction errors using the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm.
Encryption. The public key for  comprises 20k2 public keys from E indexed by a triplet
(i; j; b) 2 [k] [10k] f0; 1g; there are two keys corresponding to each entry of a k 10k matrix.
To encrypt a message m, we (a) compute (s1; : : : ; s10k) as in the above-mentioned polynomial
encoding, (b) generate (SKSIG; VKSIG) for a one-time signature, (c) compute a k  10k matrix
~c = (ci;j) of ciphertexts where ci;j = EncPKvii;j (sj), and (d) sign ~c using SKSIG.0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
EncPKv11;1
(s1) EncPKv11;2
(s2)    EncPKv11;10k(s10k)
EncPKv22;1
(s1) EncPKv22;2
(s2)    EncPKv22;10k(s10k)
...
...
. . .
...
EncPKvkk;1
(s1) EncPKvkk;2
(s2)    EncPKvkk;10k(s10k)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
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Consistency Checks. A valid ciphertext in  satisfies two properties: (1) the first row is an
encryption of a codeword in W and (2) every column comprises k encryptions of the same
plaintext. We want to design consistency checks that reject ciphertexts that are “far” from being
valid ciphertexts under . For simplicity, we will describe the consistency checks as applied to the
underlying matrix of plaintexts. The checks depend on a random subset S of k columns chosen
during key generation.
COLUMN CHECK (column-check): We check that each of the k columns in S
comprises entirely of the same value.
CODEWORD CHECK (codeword-check): We find a codeword w that agrees with
the first row of the matrix in at least 9k positions; the check fails if no such w
exists. Then we check that the first row of the matrix agrees with w at the k
positions indexed by S.
The codeword check ensures that with high probability, the first row of the matrix agrees with w in
at least 10k  o(k) positions. We explain its significance after describing the alternative decryption
algorithm in the analysis.
Decryption. To decrypt, we (a) verify the signature and run both consistency checks, and (b) if all
three checks accept, decode the codeword w and output the result, otherwise output ?. Note that to
decrypt we only need the 20k secret keys corresponding to the first row of the matrix and 2k secret
keys corresponding to each of the k columns in S.
Note that the decryption algorithm may be stream-lined, for instance, by running the codeword
check only if the column check succeeds. We choose to present the algorithm as is in order to keep
the analysis simple; in particular, we will run both consistency checks independent of the outcome
of the other.
2.4 Analysis
Having presented our construction, we now formally state and prove our main result:
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Theorem 2.4.1 (Main Theorem, restated).
Assume there exists an encryption scheme E = (Gen;Enc;Dec) that is semantically secure under a
CPA attack. Then there exists an encryption scheme = (NMGenGen;NMEncGen;Enc;NMDecGen;Dec)
that is non-malleable under a CPA attack.
We establish the theorem (as in [Dolev et al., 2000; Pass et al., 2006], etc) via a series of hybrid
arguments and deduce indistinguishability of the intermediate hybrid experiments from the semantic
security of the underlying scheme E under some set of public keys  . To do so, we will need to
implement an alternative decryption algorithmNMDec that is used in the intermediate experiments
to simulate the actual decryption algorithm NMDec in the non-malleability experiment. We need
NMDec to achieve two conflicting requirements:
 NMDec and NMDec must agree on essentially all inputs, including possibly malformed
ciphertexts;
 We can implement NMDec without having to know the secret keys corresponding to the
public keys in  .
Of course, designing NMDec is difficult precisely because NMDec uses the secret keys corre-
sponding to the public keys in  .
Here is a high-level (but extremely inaccurate) description of how NMDec works:   is the set
of public keys corresponding to the first row of the k  10k matrix. To implement NMDec, we
will decrypt the i’th row of the matrix of ciphertexts, for some i > 1, which the column check (if
successful) guarantees to agree with the first row in most positions; error correction takes care of
the tiny fraction of disagreements.
2.4.1 Alternative Decryption Algorithm NMDec
Let VKSIG = (v1; : : : ; vk) denote the verification key in the challenge ciphertext given to the
adversary in the non-malleability experiment, and let VKSIG = (v1; : : : ; vk) denote the verification
key in (one of) the ciphertext(s) generated by the adversary. First, we modify the signature check
to also output ? if there is a forgery, namely VKSIG = VKSIG. Next, we modify the consistency
checks (again, as applied to the underlying matrix of plaintexts) as follows:
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COLUMN CHECK (column-check): This is exactly as before, we check that the
each of the k columns in S comprises entirely of the same value.
CODEWORD CHECK (codeword-check): Let i be the smallest value such that
vi 6= vi (which exists since VKSIG 6= VKSIG). We find a codeword w that
agrees with the i’th row of the matrix in at least 8k positions (note agreement
threshold smaller than before); the check fails if no such w exists. Then we check
that the first row of the matrix agrees with w at the k positions indexed by S.
To decrypt, run the modified signature and consistency checks, and if all three checks accept, decode
the codeword w and output the result, otherwise output ?. To implement the modified consistency
checks and decryption algorithm, we only need the 10k secret keys indexed by VKSIG for each row
of the matrix, and as before, the 2k secret keys corresponding to each of the k columns in S.
Remark on the Codeword Check. At first, the codeword check may seem superfluous. Suppose
we omit the codeword check, and as before, define w to be a codeword that agrees with the first
row in 9k positions and with the i’th row in 8k positions in the respective decryption algorithms;
the gap is necessary to take into account inconsistencies not detected by the column check. Now,
consider a malformed ciphertext  for  where in the underlying matrix of plaintexts, each row is
the same corrupted codeword that agrees with a valid codeword in exactly 8:5k positions. Without
the codeword checks,  will be an invalid ciphertext according to NMDec and a valid ciphertext
according to NMDec and can be used to distinguish the intermediate hybrid distributions in the
analysis; with the codeword checks,  is an invalid ciphertext according to both. It is also easy to
construct a problematic malformed ciphertext for the case where both agreement thresholds are set
to the same value (say 9k).
2.4.2 A Promise Problem
Recall the guarantees we would like from NMDec and NMDec:
 On input a ciphertext that is an encryption of a message m under , both NMDec and
NMDec will outputm with probability 1.
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 On input a ciphertext that is “close” to an encryption of a message m under , both NMDec
and NMDec will output m with the same probability (the exact probability is immaterial)
and ? otherwise.
 On input a ciphertext that is “far” from any encryption, then bothNMDec andNMDec output
? with high probability.
To quantify and establish these guarantees, we consider the following promise problem (Y ;N )
that again refers to the underlying matrix of plaintexts. An instance is a matrix of k by 10k values
in f0; 1gn [ ?.
Y (YES instances) — for some w 2 W , every row equals w.
N (NO instances) — either there exist two rows that are 0:1-far (i.e. disagree in at least k
positions), or the first row is 0:1-far from every codeword in W (i.e. disagree with every
codeword in at least k positions).
Valid encryptions correspond to the YES instances, while NO instances will correspond to “far”
ciphertexts. To analyze the success probability of an adversary, we examine each ciphertext  it
outputs with some underlying matrix M of plaintexts (which may be a YES or a NO instance or
neither) and show that both NMDec and NMDec agree on  with high probability. To facilitate the
analysis, we consider two cases:
 If M 2 N , then it fails the column/codeword checks in both decryption algorithms with
high probability, in which case both decryption algorithms output ?. Specifically, if there
are two rows that are 0:1-far, then column check rejects M with probability 1   0:9k. On
the other hand, if the first row is 0:1-far from every codeword, then the codeword check in
NMDec rejectsM with probability 1 and that in NMDec rejectsM with probability at least
1   0:9k; that is, with probability 1   0:9k, both codeword checks in NMDec and NMDec
rejectsM.
 IfM =2 N , then both decryption algorithms always output the same answer for all choices
of the set S, provided there is no forgery. FixM =2 N and a set S. The first row is 0:9-close
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to codeword w 2 W and we know in addition that every other row is 0:9-close to the first
row and thus 0:8-close to w. Therefore, we will recover the same codeword w and message
m whether we decode the first row within distance 0:1, or any other row within distance 0:2.
This means that the codeword checks in both decryption algorithms compare the first row
with the same codeword w. As such, both decryption algorithms output ? with exactly the
same probability, and whenever they do not output ?, they output the same messagem.
2.4.3 Proof of Main Theorem
In the hybrid argument, we consider the following variants of NMEb as applied to , where VKSIG
denotes the verification key in the ciphertext y = NMEncPK(mb):
Experiment NME(1)b
— NME(1)b proceeds exactly like NMEb, except we replace sig-check in NMDec with
sig-check:
(sig-check) Verify the signature with VerSigVKSIG[c; ]. Output ? if the signature
fails to verify or if VKSIG = VKSIG.
Experiment NME(2)b
— NME(2)b proceeds exactly like NMEb except we replace NMDec with NMDec
:
NMDecSK([c; VKSIG; ]):
1. (sig-check) Verify the signature with VerSigVKSIG[c; ]. Output ? if the
signature fails to verify or if VKSIG = VKSIG.
2. Let c = (ci;j) and VKSIG = (v1; : : : ; vk). Let i be the smallest value such
that vi 6= vi . Compute sj = DecSKvii;j (ci;j), j = 1; : : : ; 10k and w =
(w1; : : : ; w10k) 2 W that agrees with (s1; : : : ; s10k) in at least 8k positions. If no
such codeword exists, output ?.
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3. (column-check) For all j 2 S, check that DecSKv11;j (c1;j) = DecSKv22;j (c2;j) =
   = DecSKvkk;j (ck;j).
4. (codeword-check) For all j 2 S, check that DecSKv11;j (c1;j) = wj .
If all three checks accept, output the messagem corresponding to the codewordw; else,
output ?.
Claim 2.4.2 For b 2 f0; 1g, we have
n
NMEb(;A; k; p(k))
o
c
n
NME
(1)
b (;A; k; p(k))
o
Proof: This follows readily from the security of the signature scheme.
Claim 2.4.3 For b 2 f0; 1g, we have
n
NME
(1)
b (;A; k; p(k))
o
s
n
NME
(2)
b (;A; k; p(k))
o
Proof: We will show that both distributions are statistically close for all possible coin tosses in
both experiments (specifically, those of NMGen;A and NMEnc) except for the choice of S in
NMGen. Once we fix all the coin tosses apart from the choice of S, the output ( 1; : : : ;  p(k))
of A2 are completely determined and identical in both experiments. We claim that with probability
1 2p(k) 0:9k = 1 neg(k) over the choice of S, the decryptions of ( 1; : : : ;  p(k)) agree in both
experiments. This follows from the analysis of the promise problem in Section 2.4.2.
Claim 2.4.4 For every ppt machine A, there exists a ppt machine B such that for b 2 f0; 1g,
n
NME
(2)
b (;A; k; p(k))
o

n
mINDb(E ;B; k; 9k2)
o
Proof: The machine B is constructed as follows: B participates in the experiment mINDb (the
“outside”) while internally simulating A = (A1;A2) in the experiment NME(2)b .
 (pre-processing) Pick a random subset S = fu1; : : : ; ujg of [10k] and run GenSig(1k) to
generate (SKSIG; VKSIG) and set (v1; : : : ; vk) = VKSIG
. Let  be a bijection identifying
f(i; j) j i 2 [k]; j 2 [10k] n Sg with [9k2].
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 (key generation) B receives hPK1; : : : ; PK9k2i from the outside and simulates NMGen as
follows: for all i 2 [k]; j 2 [10k];  2 f0; 1g,
(PKi;j ; SK

i;j) =
8><>:
(PK(i;j);?) if  = vi and j =2 S
Gen(1k) otherwise
 (message selection) Let (m0;m1) be the pair of messages A1 returns. B then chooses k
random values (u1 ; : : : ; uk) 2 f0; 1gn and computes two degree k polynomials p0; p1
where p interpolates the k+1 points (0;m); (u1; u1); : : : ; (uk; uk) for  2 f0; 1g. B sets
m
(i;j)
 = p(j), for i 2 [k]; j 2 [10k] n S and forwards (hm10; : : : ;m9k
2
0 i; hm11; : : : ;m9k
2
1 i)
to the outside.
 (ciphertext generation) B receives hy1; : : : ; y9k2i from the outside (according to the distribu-
tion EncPK1(m
1
b); : : : ;EncPK9k2 (m
9k2
b )) and generates a ciphertext [c; VKSIG
; ] as follows:
ci;j =
8>><>>:
y(i;j) if j =2 S
Enc
PK
v
i
i;j
(j) otherwise
B then computes the signature   SignSKSIG(c) and forwards [c; VKSIG; ] to A2. It is
straight-forward to verify that [c; VKSIG; ] is indeed a random encryption ofmb under .
 (decryption) Upon receiving a sequence of ciphertexts ( 1; : : : ;  p(k)) from A2, B decrypts
these ciphertexts using NMDec as in NME(2)b . Note that to simulate NMDec
, it suffices for
B to possess the secret keys fSKi;j j  = 1  vi or j 2 Sg, which B generated by itself.
Combining the three claims, we conclude that for every ppt adversaryA, there is a ppt adversary
B such that for b 2 f0; 1g,
n
NMEb(;A; k; p(k))
o
c
n
NME
(1)
b (;A; k; p(k))
o
s
n
NME
(2)
b (;A; k; p(k))
o

n
mINDb(E ;B; k; 9k2)
o
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By Prop 2.2.3, mIND0(E ;B; k; 9k2) c mIND1(E ;B; k; 9k2), which concludes the proof of
Theorem 2.4.1.
2.4.4 Achieving Bounded-CCA2 Non-Malleability
We sketch how our scheme may be modified to achieve non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2
attack. Here, we allow the adversary to queryDec at most q times in the non-malleability experiment
(but it must not query Dec on y). The modification is the straight-forward analogue of the [Cramer
et al., 2007] modification of the [Pass et al., 2006] scheme: we increase the number of columns in
the matrix from 10k to 80(k + q), and the degree of the polynomial p and the size of S from k to
8(k + q), and propagate the changes accordingly. The analysis is basically as before, except for
the following claim (where NME  q  CCA(1)b ;NME  q  CCA(2)b are the respective analogues
of NME(1)b ;NME
(1)
b ):
Claim 2.4.5 For b 2 f0; 1g, we have
n
NME  q  CCA(1)b (;A; k; p(k))
o
s
n
NME  q  CCA(2)b (;A; k; p(k))
o
Proof:[sketch] As before, we will show that both distributions are statistically close for all possible
coin tosses in both experiments (specifically, those of NMGen;A and NMEnc) except for the choice
of S in NMGen. However, we cannot immediately deduce that the output of A2 are completely
determined and identical in both experiments, since they depend on the adaptively chosen queries to
NMDec, and the answers depend on S. Instead, we will consider all 2q possible computation paths
of A which are determined based on the q query/answer pairs from NMDec. For each query, we
consider the underlying matrix of plaintextsM:
 IfM 2 N , then we assume NMDec returns ?.
 IfM =2 N , then we consider two branches depending on the two possible outcomes of the
consistency checks.
We claim that with probability 1   2q  p(k)  0:98(k+q) > 1   neg(k) over the choice of S, the
decryptions of ( 1; : : : ;  p(k)) agree in both experiments in all 2q computation paths.
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Remark on achieving (full) CCA2 security. It should be clear from the preceding analysis that
the barrier to obtaining full CCA2 security lies in handling queries outside N . Specifically, with
even just a (full) CCA1 attack, an adversary could query NMDec on a series of adaptively chosen
ciphertexts corresponding to matrices outside N to learn the set S upon which it could readily
break the security of our construction.
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NMGen(1k):
1. For i 2 [k]; j 2 [10k]; b 2 f0; 1g, run Gen(1k) to generate key-pairs (PKbi;j ; SKbi;j).
2. Pick a random subset S  [10k] of size k.
Set PK =
n
(PK0i;j ; PK
1
i;j) j i 2 [k]; j 2 [10k]
o
and SK =
n
S; (SK0i;j ; SK
1
i;j) j i 2 [k]; j 2
[10k]
o
.
NMEncPK(m):
1. Pick random 1; : : : ; k 2 GF(2n) and set sj = p(j); j 2 [10k] where p(x) =
m0 + 1x+ : : :+ kx
k.
2. Run GenSig(1k) to generate (SKSIG; VKSIG). Let (v1; : : : ; vk) be the binary
representation of VKSIG.
3. Compute the ciphertext ci;j  EncPKvii;j (sj), for i 2 [k]; j 2 [10k].
4. Compute the signature   SignSKSIG(~c) where ~c = (ci;j).
Output the tuple [~c; VKSIG; ].
NMDecSK([~c; VKSIG; ]):
1. (sig-check) Verify the signature with VerSigVKSIG[~c; ].
2. Let ~c = (ci;j) and VKSIG = (v1; : : : ; vk). Compute sj = DecSKv11;j (c1;j),
j = 1; : : : ; 10k and the codeword w = (w1; : : : ; w10k) 2 W that agrees with
(s1; : : : ; s10k) in at least 9k positions. If no such codeword exists, output ?.
3. (column-check) For all j 2 S, check that DecSKv11;j (c1;j) = DecSKv22;j (c2;j) =    =
DecSKvkk;j
(ck;j).
4. (codeword-check) For all j 2 S, check that sj = wj .
If all three checks accept, output the message m corresponding to the codeword w; else,
output ?.
Figure 2.2: THE NON-MALLEABLE ENCRYPTION SCHEME 
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Chapter 3
On the Black-Box Complexity of
Optimally-Fair Coin Tossing
3.1 Introduction
We study the fundamental problem of (two-party) coin tossing, where two mutually distrustful
parties wish to generate a common random bit. Ideally, this bit should be almost completely
unbiased (namely be equal to 1 with probability that is at most negligibly far from 1=2).
Furthermore, by the definition of a secure coin tossing protocol, if the two parties follow the protocol
then they must both output the same random bit. Unfortunately, however, as shown in a classic result
by Cleve [Cleve, 1986], if one of the parties may deviate from the protocol (even if the deviation is
only “fail-stop” meaning that the adversary merely aborts early), then secure coin tossing cannot be
achieved. In fact, Cleve proved that for any coin tossing protocol running for r rounds there exists
an efficient fail-stop adversary that can bias the resulting bit by at least 
(1=r).
On the positive side, an early result by Blum [Blum, 1981] uses one-way functions to construct
a coin tossing protocol in a weaker model, where an unbiased output is achieved if both parties
complete the protocol, but if a malicious party aborts early, the honest party does not output any bit.
This protocol was used by Cleve [Cleve, 1986] to construct a coin tossing protocol that runs for r
rounds and for which no efficient adversary can bias the output bit by more thanO(1=
p
r) assuming
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that one-way functions exist.1
This gap between the lower and upper bounds in [Cleve, 1986] remained open for more than two
decades. Recently, it was closed by Moran et al. [Moran et al., 2009], who constructed a protocol
for coin tossing that matches the lower-bound of [Cleve, 1986]. Specifically, they constructed an
O(r)-round protocol with the property that no adversary can bias the output by more than O(1=r).
Thus, they demonstrated that the 
(1=r) lower-bound is tight. We call such a protocol optimally-
fair because no protocol can achieve lower bias.
Interestingly, the protocol of [Moran et al., 2009] uses general secure computation and thus
requires the assumption that oblivious transfer exists (or any assumption implying it, like enhanced
trapdoor permutations). We note that by combining the works of [Kilian, 1988; Haitner et al., 2011;
Pass and Wee, 2009], it is possible to construct constant-round protocols for secure computation of
any functionality in a black-box manner from semi-honest oblivious transfer. Thus, the result of
[Moran et al., 2009] implies a black-box construction of optimally-fair coin tossing from oblivious
transfer. In contrast, the coin tossing protocol of Blum [Blum, 1981] and the protocol of [Cleve,
1986] achieving bias of O(1=
p
r) can be constructed in a black-box manner from any one-way
function. This disparity was observed by [Moran et al., 2009] who state: “A challenging problem is
to either achieve the optimal bias based on seemingly weaker assumptions (e.g., one-way functions),
or to demonstrate that oblivious transfer is in fact essential.”
In this paper we take a step toward answering this question, and show that one-way functions are
not sufficient for achieving optimally-fair coin tossing via black-box reductions when the number
of rounds r is o(n= log n) for security parameter n (i.e., the input/output length of the one-way
function). We note that the protocols mentioned above of [Cleve, 1986; Moran et al., 2009] are
indeed black-box
Theorem 3.1.1 (Main Theorem, Informal) Let  be a black-box construction for two-party
optimally-fair coin tossing based on one-way functions with input and output length n. Then the
number of rounds r of interaction in  is at least r = 
(n= log n).
Thus, we rule out black-box constructions of optimally-fair coin tossing secure against semi-
1Essentially, this protocol works by running Blum’s protocol r times sequentially and outputting the bit that appeared
in most executions. (If one of the parties halts prematurely, then the other party takes locally chosen uniformly distributed
bits as the output bits for the remaining Blum executions.)
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honest, fail-stop adversaries (with o(n= log n) rounds) from one-way functions. In contrast, the
positive result of [Moran et al., 2009] is a black-box construction of optimally-fair coin tossing
secure against malicious adversaries from oblivious transfer.
In fact, we prove something even stronger:
 Stronger primitives. The same result holds even if the primitive used in the construction
is an exponentially-hard one-way function or an exponentially hard collision resistant hash
function h : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1g(n) (or in fact any primitive which can be derived in a black-
box manner from a random oracle). The result holds also for more structured primitives such
as one-way permutation. The latter extension is based on the simple observation that a random
function and a random permutation can not be distinguished with “few” queries asked by the
construction.
 Optimality of the bias. The same result holds even when  achieves any o(1=pr) bias (not
only for optimally-fair protocols with a bias of O(1=r)).
Our main technical lemma in order to prove Theorem 3.1.1 is to show how to remove random
oracles from certain secure protocols in the random oracle models which we believe to be of
independent interest.
Lemma 3.1.2 (Simulation Lemma, Informal) Let be a two-party protocol in the random oracle
model in which the parties query a (random) oracle of input/output length n, ask a total of m =
poly(n) queries and communicate for o(n= log n) rounds. Then there are two protocols: E (the
extended protocol) and T (the threshold-simulation protocol) such that the following holds. (a) In
E the parties act as  but the ask up to 2o(n) extra queries from the oracle. (b) T is performed
in the plain model without the random oracle. (c) The joint views of the parties in E and T are
-close for an arbitrary parameter  = 1=poly(n).
The high level structure of the proof of Theorem 3.1.1 is to use the simulation lemma and the
result of [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993] which breaks any coin-tossing protocol in the plain model
with “few” rounds. See Section 3.1.1 for more details.
We also observe that our simulation lemma can be used to derive impossibility results in the
context of secure two-party computation of non-trivial functions. Kushilevitz [Kushilevitz, 1992]
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classified the finite functions that have perfectly secure two-party protocols against semi-honest
adversaries and called them “decomposable functions”. Maji, Prabhakaran and Rosulek [Maji et al.,
2009] extended this result to the regime of statistical security and showed that only decomposable
functions can have (randomized) two-party protocols which are statistically secure against semi-
honest parties. The latter result together with our simulation lemma imply that if a function is not
decomposable, it can not have a black-box secure protocol based on one-way function (or based
on the other primitives mentioned above) with o(n= log n) rounds of communication. The steps of
the proof of this result are very similar to the case of coin-tossing described in Theorem 3.1.1. See
Section 3.1.1 for more details.
Discussion and Implications. Our lower-bound proves that either there is no black-box
construction of optimally-fair coin tossing from any of the primitives mentioned in Theorem 3.4.1,
or if there is any such construction it will suffer from an almost linear e
(n) lower-bound on
its round-complexity (which arguably is the main efficiency measure) depending on the security
parameter of the primitive used. We leave open the question of whether there exists an e
(n)-
round optimally fair coin-tossing protocol from one-way function (or any of the other primitives
mentioned in Theorem 3.4.1). However, such a construction, where the number of rounds, and thus
the bias, must depend on the security parameter, seems counter-intuitive and is unlike the known
coin-tossing protocols of [Cleve, 1986; Moran et al., 2009] (yet see the comparison below with
statistically hiding commitments which do have constructions with the number of rounds depending
on the security parameter).
In particular, our negative result implies that the use of oblivious transfer (as an assumption
stronger than one-way function) in the construction of [Moran et al., 2009], achieving O(1=r) bias
for any r, is inherent. Moreover, the construction of [Cleve, 1986], using commitments (that can be
constructed in a black-box way from one-way functions) and achieving O(1=
p
r) bias for any r, is
actually optimal (as Theorem 3.4.1 holds for any o(1=
p
r) bias).
It is also interesting to contrast our lower bound with the original impossibility result of Cleve
[Cleve, 1986]. One way to view the result of [Cleve, 1986] is as a proof that in order to achieve
O(1=r) bias any protocol must have at least 
(r) rounds of interaction. Our lower bound then says
that it is only possible to achieve O(1=r) bias with r rounds when relying on one-way functions
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(or any of the primitives mentioned in Theorem 3.4.1) for r = 
(n= log n) which is very large.
In particular, it is not possible to construct a protocol (using a black-box reduction) whose round
efficiency depends only on the desired bias and is independent of the security parameter n used to
determine the input length to the one-way function. This has the ramification that increasing the
security parameter in order to obtain a stronger guarantee of invertibility of the one-way function
(to get a more secure protocol) has an effect also on the round complexity of the protocol.
Our work also leaves open the question of whether there exists an optimally fair coin-tossing
protocol based on semantically-secure public-key encryption (PKE) for r = o(n= log n) number of
rounds. This is an interesting question since there is no black-box reduction from oblivious transfer
to public key encryption [Gertner et al., 2000] or from public key encryption to one-way function
[Impagliazzo and Rudich, 1989]. This tells us that, with respect to black-box reductions, public
key encryption is a strictly stronger primitive than one-way function but a strictly weaker primitive
than oblivious transfer. Thus, we may ask whether the [Moran et al., 2009] positive result relies on
the full power of multi-party computation (which is implied by oblivious transfer but not by public
key encryption) or whether it merely exploits the ability to do key agreement (which is implied by
public key encryption but not by one-way function).
Black-Box Separations. One of the main goals of modern cryptography has been to identify the
minimal assumptions necessary to construct secure cryptographic primitives. For example, [Yao,
1982; Goldwasser and Micali, 1984; Rompel, 1990; Ha˚stad et al., 1999; Goldreich et al., 1986;
Luby and Rackoff, 1988; Impagliazzo and Luby, 1989; Naor and Yung, 1989; Naor, 1991]
have shown that private key encryption, pseudorandom generators, pseudorandom functions and
permutations, bit commitment, and digital signatures exist if and only if one-way functions exist.
On the other hand, some cryptographic primitives such as public key encryption, oblivious transfer,
and key agreement are not known to be equivalent to one way functions. Thus, it is natural to ask
whether the existence of one-way functions implies these primitives. However, it seems unclear
how to formalize such a question; since it is widely believed that both one-way functions and
public key encryption exist, this would imply in a trivial logical sense that the existence of one-
way functions implies the existence of public key encryption. Thus, we can only hope to rule out
restricted types of constructions that are commonly used to prove implications in cryptography.
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Impagliazzo and Rudich [Impagliazzo and Rudich, 1989] were the first to develop a technique to
rule out the existence of an important class of reductions between primitives known as black-box
reductions. Intuitively, this is a reduction where the primitive is treated as an oracle or a “black-
box”. There are actually several flavors of black-box reductions (fully black-box, semi black-box
and weakly black-box [Reingold et al., 2004]). In our work, we only deal with fully black-box
reduction, and so we will focus on this notion here. Informally, a fully black-box reduction from a
primitiveQ to a primitive P is a pair of oracle PPT Turing machines (G;S) such that the following
two properties hold:
Correctness: For every implementation f of primitive P , g = Gf implements Q.
Security: For every implementation f of primitive P , and every adversary A, if A breaks Gf (as
an implementation of Q) then SA;f breaks f . (Thus, if f is “secure”, then so is Gf .)
We remark that an implementation of a primitive is any specific scheme that meets the
requirements of that primitive (e.g., an implementation of a public-key encryption scheme provides
samplability of key pairs, encryption with the public-key, and decryption with the private key).
Correctness thus states that when G is given oracle access to any valid implementation of P , the
result is a valid implementation of Q. Furthermore, security states that any adversary breaking Gf
yields an adversary breaking f . The reduction here is fully black-box in the sense that the adversary
S breaking f uses A in a black-box manner.
Comparison to Similar Lower-Bounds on the Round-Complexity. The only similar lower-
bound on the round-complexity of black-box constructions that we are aware of is the result of
Haitner, Hoch, Reingold, and Segev [Haitner et al., 2007] which deals with the round-efficiency
of statistically hiding commitment schemes. Interestingly, our lower-bound is exactly the same
as that of [Haitner et al., 2007] which also is based on the security parameter of the one-way
function used in the construction . It seems that the techniques used in [Haitner et al., 2007] and our
techniques explained below are quite different. This raises the question of whether there are more
connections between the two results. For instance, is it possible to simplify any of these arguments
using ideas from the other work? More importantly, this suggests the intriguing possibility that
perhaps a positive solution for optimally-fair coin tossing from one-way functions can be achieved
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with O(n= log n) rounds, using the techniques which are used in constructing the positive results of
O(n= log n)-round statistically hiding commitments [Naor et al., 1998; Haitner and Reingold, 2007;
Haitner et al., 2009]. We note, however, that there is a black-box construction of collision-resistant
hash functions (CRHF) in the random oracle model. This implies that our black-box separation
extends also to constructions of optimally-fair coin tossing from CRHF. In contrast, since there
exists an O(1)-round protocol for statistically-hiding commitment from CRHF, the [Haitner et al.,
2007] result clearly does not extend to constructions from CRHF.
3.1.1 Our Technique
We recall a result of Cleve and Impagliazzo [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993] which shows that for
any coin tossing protocol with r rounds, there exists a computationally unbounded adversary who
can achieve bias of at least 
(1=
p
r) (see Appendix A.1). Moreover, this adversary follows the
protocol as specified, except that it may abort prematurely; as such the adversary is fail-stop. We
show that a black-box construction of an o(n= log n)-round coin tossing from own-way functions
with input/output length n (or in fact any primitive which is implied by a random-function in a
black-box way) will essentially suffer from the same attack of [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993] and
thus cannot guarantee any bias below 
(1=
p
r) through a black-box proof of security.
We start by assuming that there is a black-box construction of optimally-fair coin tossing from
one-way function with r = o(n= log n) rounds. A random function is one-way with overwhelming
probability, so informally speaking, if we feed the construction  with a random function it
should still be an optimally-fair coin tossing protocol. In fact, something stronger happens when
a construction based on one-way function is fed with a random function: Such a construction will
now be secure even against computationally unbounded adversaries who are allowed to ask 2o(n)
oracle queries to the random oracle. The reason for this is that if there were such an adversary,
then the security reduction will imply that there is an adversary inverting a random function with
2o(n) number of queries (see the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 for more details) which is not possible.
We will take advantage of this stronger property to derive the contradiction by presenting a 2o(n)-
query attack whenever the round complexity is o(n= log n). The idea of feeding a black-box
construction with a random-function and enhancing its security, and then deriving contradiction
by a simple counting argument (rather than refuting the relativizing reductions [Impagliazzo and
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Rudich, 1989]—which is a much harder task) is also employed in previous works such as [Gennaro
et al., 2005; Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary, 2007].
Our main technical step will be to show that the round-complexity of o(n= log n) for the black-
box construction of coin tossing implies the existence of a 2o(n)-query adversary who is able to bias
the output bit by !(1=r). In fact we show how to achieve bias 
(1=
p
r) = !(1=r). The existence
of such an attack implies the result because by the security reduction the ability to bias the protocol
yields an adversary inverting the one-way function. Our 2o(n)-query attacker runs the protocol (of
the corresponding party) honestly except that it gathers more information about the random oracle
along the execution of the protocol by asking poly(n; r)r (which is 2o(n) for r = o(n= log n)) more
queries and achieves bias of 
(1=
p
r) by deciding to stop at some point during the protocol.
We shall emphasize that the reason that we can not directly use the attack of [Cleve and
Impagliazzo, 1993] in the presence of a random oracle is that, even conditioned on the transcript
of the interaction, the random oracle builds dependencies between the views of Alice and Bob.
However the attack of [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993] essentially uses the fact that conditioned on
the transcript the views of Alice and Bob are independent in a plain protocol (where no random
oracle is used). Thus we need to find a way to “kill” this dependency to be able to use their attack.
Our 2o(n)-query attacker uses special properties of an attack given by Barak and Mahmoody
[Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] to break any key-agreement protocol with an optimal number of
queries to the random oracle. The attacker of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]—which here we call
the “independence learning algorithm”, or the simply the learning algorithm for short—gets as
input a threshold parameter  which controls its efficiency and accuracy at the same time. Roughly
speaking if Alice and Bob ask m oracle queries in their execution, it will lead to O(m=) queries
asked by the learner and the error of m. This learning algorithm can be described more naturally
as an online algorithm which learns certain oracle queries during the interaction between Alice and
Bob (despite the fact that passive adversaries can always wait till the end of the interaction). Our
attacker uses this learning algorithm internally and feeds it with different values for the threshold
parameter  for each round; the parameter  taken grows exponentially with the round numbers.
Due to the heavy use of the threshold parameter of the learning algorithm in our attack, we call it
the “threshold attacker” TA. Note that since the learning algorithm only requires the knowledge of
the public transcripts, both Alice and Bob can run the learning algorithm in any two-party protocol
CHAPTER 3. ON THE BLACK-BOX COMPLEXITY OF OPTIMALLY-FAIR COIN TOSSING 41
(e.g., a coin tossing protocol rather than a key-agreement protocol). Thus our threshold attacker TA,
which is in fact executed by either Alice or Bob, can also run the learning algorithm during the coin
tossing protocol.
The Threshold Attacker—More Details. For an arbitrary two-party protocol  in the random
oracle model (or any other oracle model) we can think of “curious” parties who run the protocol
honestly but will ask more oracle queries along their execution of the protocol2. We use the
terminology of [Goyal et al., 2010] and call such a game a curious extension of the original protocol
. To get the threshold attacker, Alice or Bob (whoever is performing the attack) will need to
play a curious extension of the original protocol by asking up to 2o(n) oracle queries. Here we
will only deal with an extension based on the learning algorithm of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009].
That is, the attacking party runs the learning algorithm along the honest execution of the original
coin-tossing protocol and decides to abort prematurely. We let the parties take turn in simulating
the learning algorithm in the following way: Whenever Alice (or Bob) is sending a message wi,
they attach to it the set of query/answer pairs that the learning algorithm would learn after wi is sent
across the channel. For brevity we call this specific curious extension in which both Alice and Bob
run the learning algorithm along the original game (and attach the learner’s view of each round to
their messages) simply “the extended execution” of the original protocol (without referring to the
learning algorithm explicitly). We show how our threshold attacker can perform their attack in the
extended execution.
We prove that the extended protocol has the interesting property that now Alice and Bob can in
fact “simulate” the random oracle on their own (using their private randomness) in a way that their
views are statistically close to those in the execution of the original extended game in the random
oracle model. To perform the simulation, Alice and Bob will answer their queries to the random
oracle using fresh randomness unless they have asked this query at some point before (and thus
chose the answer already) or that they are told by the other party what the answer to this query
should be (through the extra messages simulating the learner’s view).
To prove that the above simple simulation is indeed a statistically-close simulation of the
2This is slightly different from the semi-honest parties who run the protocol honestly without asking more oracle
queries and only later analyze their view of the interaction.
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extension game we need to show that (unless with small probability) there is no inconsistencies
between the oracle answers chosen by Alice and Bob for their oracle queries. Here we crucially use
the fact that the learning algorithm provides enough information along the game so that Alice and
Bob will always choose consistent oracle answers for their queries. Suppose that Alice is sending
a message wi and is also attaching a list of k  m=i simulated learning queries to the message
wi where i is the learner’s threshold used in round i by Alice andm is the total number of queries
in the original protocol. For any query q among these k queries which are being asked by Alice
from the random oracle (and thus being simulated) for the first time, we want that q is not among
Bob’s “private” queries which was simulated at some point before (yet is not announced through
the learner’s simulation). The learner’s algorithm has the property that if Bob uses threshold i 1 to
simulate the learner in the previous round i  1 then any such query q has chance of at most i 1 to
be a “private” query of Bob. Therefore, by a union bound, the probability that any of these k queries
cause an inconsistency is at most  ki 1 = mi 1=i. By taking i 1  i=m, we can control
the probability of such event to be arbitrary small. This clarifies why we end up using exponentially
smaller thresholds for smaller rounds.
Finally, since we could simulate the extended execution through a plain protocol, we can use the
inefficient attack of [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993], which can be applied to any plain protocol and
apply it to the simulation of the extension game. Since the extended execution and its simulation
are statistically close experiments, we conclude that almost the same bias would be achieved by the
attacker in the extension execution with only 2o(n) queries and so we are done.
A Parallel Work. The threshold simulation technique was discovered independently in a parallel
work by Maji and Prabhakaran [Maji and Prabhakaran, 2010] in the context of using random oracle
for the aim of achieving statistically secure protocols.
3.2 Definitions and Useful Lemmas
Definition 3.2.1 (coin tossing from one-way function) For (interactive) oracle algorithms A;B
we call  = hA;Bi a black-box construction of coin tossing with bias at most  based on
exponentially-hard one-way functions with security parameter n, if the following properties hold:
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 A and B have their own private randomness RA; RB. They take as input 1n and run in time
poly(n) and interact for r(n) = poly(n) number of rounds.
 Completeness: For any function f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn, when A and B are given oracle
access to f , then at the end of the protocol A’s output a and B’s output b are such that
a = b and b is considered the output of the protocol. Also if during the protocol A (resp.,
B) receives the special message ? (denoting that the other party has stopped playing in the
protocol) then A (resp., B) outputs a bit a (resp b) on their own which is considered as the
output of the protocol.
 Security (against bias ): There is an oracle algorithm S running in time 2o(n) with the
following property. For any f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn given as oracle, if bA (resp., bB) is a
malicious interactive algorithm interacting with B (resp., A) which makes the output bit b
to be (n)-biased, then Sf;bA (given oracle access to f and bA) breaks the security of f (as an
exponentially-hard one-way function).
We denote by (ajb)  hbA;Bi (resp. (ajb)  hA; bBi) the joint output of bA and B (resp. A and bB)
generated by an interaction of bA and B (resp. A and bB).
The proof of the following two lemmas can be verified by inspection.
Lemma 3.2.2 (Inverting Random Functions) Let A be a computationally unbounded oracle
algorithm given oracle access to a random function f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn (the randomness of
f is chosen after A is fixed). Then if A asks at most 2n queries from f , the probability that A can
successfully invert a given input y = f(Un) (to any preimage of y) is at most 2  2( 1)n + 2 n
which is negligible for any constant  < 1.
Lemma 3.2.3 (Inverting Random Functions with a Fixed Subdomain) Let S  f0; 1gn be of
size jSj  2n for  < 1, and let fS : S 7! f0; 1gn be a fixed function. Let F be the set of all
functions f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn which are equal to fS over S. Now, let A be a computationally
unbounded oracle algorithm which can depend on fS and is given oracle access to a random
function f  R F (the randomness of f is chosen after A is fixed). Then if A asks at most 2n
queries from f , the probability that A can successfully invert a given input y = f(Un) (to any
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preimage of y) is at most 2  (2( 1)n+2( 1)n)+ 2 n which is negligible for any constants  < 1
and  < 1.
3.3 Simulation Lemma
In this section, we present a general lemma that holds for any two-party protocol in the random
oracle model. This lemma will be useful for proving our result on coin tossing, but also has
applications to general two-party computation as we describe below.
Lemma 3.3.1 (Simulation Lemma) Let  be a two-party protocol between Alice and Bob in the
random oracle model where they ask at most m oracle queries and interact for r rounds. Then
there exist protocols T and E called the -threshold simulation and -extended execution of 
such that the views of Alice and Bob (as a jointly distributed random variable) in T and E are
-close. Moreover, the following properties hold:
 T makes no oracle queries.
 For  = 1=poly(n), r = o(n= log n) andm = poly(n), E makes at most 2o(n) queries.
 LetW = [w1 ; : : : ; wi ] be the sequence of messages sent between Alice and Bob so far in
an execution of protocol  relative to oracle f with random tapes RA; RB respectively. For
 = 1=poly(n), r = o(n= log n) andm = poly(n), both Alice and/or Bob can make at most
2o(n) queries and produce the transcript WE = [wE1 ; : : : ; w
E
i ] that is generated by an
execution of the protocol E relative to oracle f with random tapes RA; RB.
The above lemma implies the following corollary:
Corollary 3.3.2 Let p = 1=poly(n) and let Q be some two-party cryptographic task such that
for every implementation plain in the plain model with r = o(n= log n) rounds, there is a
computationally-unbounded, semi-honest, fail-stop adversary which breaks the security of plain
with probability p. Let  be a black-box construction of Q with r rounds based on exponentially-
hard one-way functions with security parameter n (i.e. the input/output length of f ). Then
r = 
(n= log n).
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In other words, Corollary 3.3.2 implies that unless there exists an implementation of Q in
the plain model that ensures security and fairness for semi-honest parties, there is no black-box
construction ofQ from one-way functions (with input/outpus length n) that with o(n= log n) rounds.
The corollary follows from Lemma 3.3.1 due to the following: Assume such a construction 
exists with r = o(n= log n) rounds. Now consider T , the -threshold simulation of . Since
T also has r = o(n= log n) rounds and does not make calls to the oracle, we have by hypothesis
that there is an unbounded attacker bA (resp. bB) which breaks the security of T with probability
p = 1=poly(n). Now, for   p=2 = 1= poly(n), we have that the views of Alice and Bob
(as a jointly distributed random variable) in T and in the -extended exection, E , are -close.
Moreover, given the transcript generated by , Alice (resp. Bob) can make at most 2o(n) queries
and produce the corresponding transcript of E . Thus, there is a threshold attacker TA which plays
the part of Alice (resp. Bob) in, makes at most 2o(n) queries to compute the messages ofE , runsbA (resp. bB) internally while simulating the view of bA (resp. bB) using the -close view produced by
E and finally outputs whatever bA (resp. bB) outputs. So TA breaks the security of E (and thus of
) with probability p=2, where the probability is computed over the randomness of f . Having the
threshold attacker TA the proof can be concluded as follows:
(a) Since the attacker TA breaks security with probability p=2 = 1=poly(n), by an averaging
argument, for at least p=4 fraction of the functions f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn, the attacker TAf breaks
security with probability p=4. We call such function f , a good function. (b) Using the security
reduction S, for all good functions f , Sf;TA
f
inverts y = f(Un) with probability at least 2 o(n).
(c) We can combine the algorithms S and TA to get a single oracle algorithm T f which inverts
f(Un) with probability 2 o(n) when f is a good function by asking only 2o(n) queries to f . Which
means that in this case T asks only 2o(n) oracle queries and inverts a random f with probability at
least p=4  2 o(n) = 2 o(n) (because f is a good function with probability at least p=4). The latter
contradicts Lemma 3.2.2.
Before we prove Lemma 3.3.1, we review relevant previous work.
The Independence Learner of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]. Here we describe the properties
of the attacker of Barak and Mahmoody [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] presented in the context of
breaking any key agreement protocol with optimal number of queries to the random oracle. Since
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the main property of the learning algorithm is that conditioned on the learner’s information Alice
and Bob’s views are almost independent, we call this attack the independence learning algorithm.
Lemma 3.3.3 (The Independence Learner of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]) Let be any two-
party protocol in the random oracle model (with arbitrary number of rounds) between Alice and Bob
in which Alice and Bob ask at mostm queries from the random oracleH . Then there is a universal
constant c and a (computationally unbounded) independence learning algorithm which is given a
parameter  (called the threshold) as input and has the following properties. For brevity we denote
the independence learning algorithm by Eve.
 Eve only has access the public messages sent between Alice and Bob and can ask queries
from the random oracle.
 (cm=)-Efficiency: Eve is deterministic and, over the randomness of the oracle and Alice
and Bob’s private randomness, the expected number of Eve queries from the oracle H is at
most cm=.
 Eve asks its queries along the game. Namely, although Eve can wait till the end and then ask
all of her queries, her description defines which queries to be asked right after each message
is sent across the public channel. So the learning algorithm is divided into the same number
of rounds as the protocol.
 (cpm)-Security: Let W = [w1; : : : ; wi] be the sequence of messages sent between Alice
and Bob so far, and let I be the list of oracle query/answer pairs that Eve has asked till the
end of the i’th round, and let AB = (A;B) be the joint distribution over the views of Alice
and Bob only conditioned on (W; I). By A and B we refer to the projections of AB over
its first or second components (referring to the view of either Alice or Bob only) as random
variables. For a specific view A A for Alice, by Q(A) we refer to the set of oracle queries
that A contains. We also use the notation Q(I) to refer to the queries denoted in I .
With probability at least 1 cpm over the randomness of Alice, Bob, and the random oracle
H the following holds at all moments during the protocol when Eve is done with her learning
phase in that round: There are independent distributions bA; bB such that:
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1. The statistical distance between bA bB andAB is at most (bA bB;AB)  cpm.
2. For every oracle query q 62 Q(I), it holds that Pr[q 2 Q(bA) [Q(bB)]  .
 Robustness. The learning algorithm is robust to the input parameter  in the following sense.
If the parameter  changes in the interval  2 [1; 2] arbitrarily during the learner’s execution
(even inside a learning phase of a specific round), it still preserves O(cm=1)-efficiency and
(c
p
m2)-security.
Lemma 3.3.3 is implicit in [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009], and we show how to derive it from
the explicit results of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] in Appendix A.2.
Given a protocol , we now describe the -extended execution, E , and the -threshold
simulation, T , of  that were mentioned in Lemma 3.3.1.
Definition 3.3.4 (Extended Execution) Let  be a two-party protocol between Alice and Bob in
the random oracle model where they ask at most m oracle queries and interact for r rounds. The
extended execution E of  gets as input a parameter  and simulates the original protocol  in
the random oracle model as follows.
 Let r = 1m 
 

9rc
2
and for j 2 fr; r   1; : : : ; 2g define "j 1 = "j  290r2m . Note that if
r; ;m are  poly(n), then r = 1=poly(n) and 1 = poly(n) r.
 Now imagine an Eve who runs the independence learner of Lemma 3.3.3 and uses i as its
learning parameter in the learning phase after the i’th round.
 In round i, the party who is sending the message wi, also runs the i’ih round of the learning
phase of Eve and attaches to wi the list of all the query/answer pairs that are the result of this
learning algorithm. Note that since Eve’s algorithm is only depending on the messages being
sent and her previous knowledge about the oracle, the parties are able to do this job.
Definition 3.3.5 (Threshold Simulation) Let  be a two-party protocol between Alice and Bob in
the random oracle model where they ask at most m oracle queries and interact for r rounds. A
threshold simulation T of  gets as input a parameter  and simulates the original protocol 
plainly as follows.
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 The parameters i for i 2 [r] are defined similar to the extended execution.
 In the i’th round the party who sends the i’th message tries to simulate the i’th round of the
extended execution but without using a random oracle. The way the simulation is done is as
follows: To compute the message wi, suppose q is a query to be asked from the oracle. Now if
q is in the set of queries learned by Eve so far or if q was asked previously by the same party,
the same answer will be returned which was used before. But, if the query q is new, a fresh
random answer will be used. The same is also done to answer any query that the learning
algorithm Eve tries to learn.
The following lemma explains why a threshold simulation is indeed a good simulation of the
extended execution.
Lemma 3.3.6 (Properties of the Threshold Simulation) Let  be a two-party protocol between
Alice and Bob in the random oracle model where they ask at mostm oracle queries and let T and
E be in order its -threshold simulation and -extended execution. Then the views of Alice and
Bob (as a jointly distributed random variable) in T and E are -close.
Proof: It is easy to see that the extended execution and the threshold simulation will be exactly
the same games until the following happens: A party, say Alice sends a message wi along with the
simulation of Eve’s i’th round, but one of these queries (which are asked in this round either for her
own protocol or to simulate Eve) will hit one of Bob’s “private” queries which are not announced
through Eve’s previous simulated query/answers. We show that this “bad” event happens with
probability at most .
Note that by the robustness of the independence learner Eve and by the choice of the (largest)
parameter r = 1m 
 

9rc
2
, Eve’s algorithm remains at least c
p
m = =(9r) secure in round i. So,
except with probability at most r  =(9r) = =9 we can pretend (as a mental experiment) that at
all moments the security requirement of the learning algorithm holds with probability 1 rather than
1   cpm. In the following we show that (up to the bad event mentioned above which happens
with probability at most =9) the probability that an “inconsistency” happens in round i is at most
=(3r), and thus we will be done by a union bound. By inconsistency we mean that Alice announces
(a different) answer for an oracle query that is privately asked by Bob already (or vice versa).
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Suppose Alice is sending the message in the i’th round and suppose no inconsistency has
happened so far. Let fix W = [w1; : : : ; wi 1] to be the sequence of the messages sent till this
moment and let I be the union Eve’s simulated queries till the end of the (i   1)’th round. An
inconsistency in round i can happen as follows: one of the queries asked by Alice (either to run
her own protocol or to simulate Eve) hits one of Bob’s private queries. We bound this probability
conditioned on any fixed (W; I) over which the security property of the learner holds (as we said
this property will hold with probability at least 1  =9).
As a mental experiment we can continue the game (after fixing (W; I)) by sampling from the
random variable (A;B)  AB for the views of Alice and Bob so far conditioned on (W; I) and
then continue Alice’s simulation. Let assume for a moment that we sample (A;B) bA bB rather
than from AB. We bound the probability of any inconsistency in the former case to be 2=(9r),
and since the distributions AB and bA  bB are =(9r) close, it follows that the probability of any
inconsistency in this round is bounded by 2  =(9r) + =(9r) = =(3r) which is small enough for
us.
But now we use the security property of the independence learner. Note that when we get the
sample (A;B) bA bB, A and B are sampled independently. So, we can sample A first, continue
Alice’s computation, and then sample B  bB at the end (and we will abort if the private queries
collide). The number of queries that Alice will ask to run her own protocol is at most m. By the
efficiency property of the learning algorithm applied to round i, the number of Eve’s simulated
queries in this round are, on average, at most cm="i. By a Markov bound, this number is at most
cm
"i
 9r with probability at least 1   =(9r). So except with probability =(9r) the total number
of queries asked by Alice in this round is at mostm+ 9cmr=(j) < 10cmr=(j). Note that the
probability that any of these 10cmr=(j) queries are among the private queries of a sample frombB (sampled as Bob’s view) is at most j 1. So, by a union bound, the probability that at least one of
these queries hits bB’s private queries is at most 10cmrj  "j 1 = =(9r) and this finishes the proof.
So, all left to do is to count how many queries are asked by our -extended execution E and
show that it is (say on average) at most 2o(n). This is indeed the case because of the robustness
and the efficiency properties of the learning algorithm. The smallest threshold used in our attack is
1 = poly(n)
 r because  = 1=r and r = poly(n);m = poly(n). Therefore our attacker asks
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at most O(m=1) number of queries on average which for r = o(n= log n) is at most O(m=1) =
poly(n)r = 2o(n).
3.4 Proof of the Main Theorem
In this section we first prove our main theorem for the case of exponentially-hard one-way function
as the primitive used. Extending the proof to stronger primitives implied by a random oracle is
discussed at the end.
Theorem 3.4.1 (Main Theorem, Formal) Let  be a black-box construction for two-party coin
tossing (between Alice and Bob) with bias at most o(1=
p
r) (where r is the number of rounds in
) based on exponentially-hard one-way functions with security parameter n (i.e., the input/output
length of f ). Then r = 
(n= log n).
Proof: For sake of contradiction let assume that such construction exists with r = o(n= log n) round
complexity. The proof goes through the following steps. We first feed Alice and Bob’s protocols
in the construction  with a random function f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn. We show that in that setting
at least one of the parties can ask nO(r) queries to f and bias the output by at least 
(1=
p
r) by a
fail-stop attack. The probability over which the bias is computed also includes the randomness of
f . As in Section 3.3, we call this attacker the threshold attacker, TA. Having the threshold attacker
TA the proof can be concluded as follows.
(a) Since the attacker TA achieves bias  = 
(1=
p
r) and since the bias is always  < 1,
therefore by an averaging argument, for at least =2 fraction of the functions f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn,
the attacker TAf achieves bias at least =2 = 
(1=
p
r). We call such function f , a good function.
(b) Using the security reduction S, for all good functions f , Sf;TAf inverts y = f(Un) with
probability at least 2 o(n). (c) We can combine the algorithms S and TA to get a single oracle
algorithm T f which inverts f(Un) with probability 2 o(n) when f is a good function by asking
only 2o(n) poly(n)r queries to f . For r = o(n= log n), it holds that poly(n)r = 2o(n), which
means that in this case T asks only 2o(n)  2o(n) = 2o(n) oracle queries and inverts a random f with
probability at least 2  2 o(n) = 2 o(n) (because f is a good function with probability at least =2).
The latter contradicts Lemma 3.2.2.
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In the following we first describe the results that we borrow or derive from previous work needed
for our threshold attacker TA, and then will describe and prove the properties of TA.
The Fail Stop Attacker of [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993]. Cleve and Impagliazzo [Cleve and
Impagliazzo, 1993] showed that when computationally unbounded parties participate in any coin
tossing protocol, at least one of them can bias the output bit by following the protocol honestly and
aborting at some point based on the information provided to them by their view.
Lemma 3.4.2 (The Attacker of [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993]) Let  be any two-party protocol
for coin tossing between Alice and Bob with r rounds of interaction. Then either Alice or Bob can
bias the output bit by 
(1=
p
r) in the fail-stop model through a computationally unbounded attack.
3.4.1 Our Threshold Attacker
In this section we use the attack of Lemma 3.4.2 as well as the results of Section 3.3 to finish the
proof of Theorem 3.4.1 by presenting our threshold attacker. We will do so first in a special case
where the protocol  is of a special form which we call instant. The case of instant constructions
carries the main ideas of the proof. Later we prove Theorem 3.4.1 for constructions which are not
necessarily instant.
Definition 3.4.3 (Instant Constructions) A black-box construction of coin tossing is an instant
construction if whenever a party aborts the protocol, the other party decides on the output bit
without asking any additional queries to its oracle.
We note that the protocol of Cleve [Cleve, 1986] which achieves bias at most O(1=
p
r) based on
one-way function is in fact an instant construction.
Given an instant coin-tossing protocol , we apply Lemma 3.3.1 to obtain the -threshold
simulation and -extended execution of , T , E . Since the threshold simulation, T , is a plain
protocol we can apply Lemma 3.4.2 to get an attack of bias 
(1=
p
r) by either Alice or Bob. Now
if we take the simulation parameter  to be at most 1=r = o(1=
p
r), then the same exact attack will
also give a bias of 
(1=
p
r)   o(1=pr) = 
(1=pr) in the extended execution. Here we crucially
rely on the instant property because of the following: As soon as Alice or Bob (who is the attacker)
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stops continuing the game, the other party in the threshold simulation will decide on the final output
bit by looking at their current view. But this last step will not be statistically close between the
extended execution and the threshold execution if in the extended execution the deciding party
chooses the output after asking more queries. In other words, if the party who announces the output
bit (not the attacker) wants to ask more oracle queries to compute the output bit, there should be
some simulated random answers chosen by the corresponding party in the threshold simulation to
on behalf of these queries, but that step is not taken care of by Lemma 3.3.6 (because the aborted
party is not given the learning algorithm’s queries for the aborted round). By Lemma 3.3.1, our
attacker asks at most 2o(n) queries.
Before going over how to handle the non-instant constructions we clarify that extending
Theorem 3.4.1 to stronger primitives such as exponentially-hard collision resistant hash function
is immediate. All one has to do is to substitute the collision resistant hash functions h : f0; 1gn 7!
f0; 1gn=2 used in the construction by a random function f : f0; 1gn 7! f0; 1gn=2 (which is in fact
a 2
(n)-secure hash function). To provide access to a family of hash functions one can use the
random oracle over larger domains of input/output length 3n and use the first n bits of the input as
the index to the hash family and simply throw away the last 5n2 bits of the output. The rest of the
proof remains the same.
3.4.2 Handling Non-instant Constructions
It is instructing to recall that given a random oracle there is indeed a one-round protocol which is
optimally-fair: Alice asksH(0) (assuming that the random oracle is Boolean) and then sendsH(0)
to Bob which is the final output bit. If Alice aborts and does not send H(0), Bob will go ahead
and ask H(0) himself and takes that as the final output bid. It is clear that this trivial protocol is
completely fair because H(0) is an unbiased bit. Also note that the proof of the previous section
handing the instant constructions works just as well for protocols which use a truly random oracle
(rather than a one-way function) as their primitive used. So it should be of no surprise that the proof
of the instant case does not immediately generalize to cover all the black-box constructions (the
trivial coin-tossing protocol based on random oracle is clearly a non-instant protocol). To handle
the non-instant constructions we inherently need to use the fact that the constructions we deal with
are optimally-fair protocols given any one-way function as the primitive used. In the following we
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show how this stronger requirement of the construction gives us what we need in Theorem 3.4.1.
Making constructions almost instant. It is easy to see that any construction for coin tossing can
be changed into an equivalent protocol which is “almost” an instant one. Namely, whenever a party
A is sending a message m, it can also consider the possibility that the other party B will abort the
game right after A sends his message. So, during the computation of m, A can go ahead and ask
whatever query from the oracle which is needed to compute the final bit in case B aborts. This way,
A will not need to ask any oracle queries in case B aborts in this round. By doing this change (which
clearly does not affect the security of the protocol) the construction becomes “almost” instant. The
point is that the receiver of the first message can not follow the change suggested here because
they do not send any message before the first round. Therefore, in the following we only consider
constructions which are “almost-instant” (i.e., the only moment that a party might violate the instant
property is when the sender of the first message aborts the protocol, and the receiver might still need
to ask oracle queries before deciding on the output.)
Handling almost-instant constructions. Suppose  is an almost-instant construction. Suppose
E and T be in order ’s extended execution and the threshold simulation games. The proof of
Lemma 3.3.6 shows that if no party aborts the experiments E and T are -close. The discussion
following the proof of Lemma 3.3.6 shows that if one of the parties runs the same fail-stop attack in
E and T the experiments are still -close conditioned on the assumption that the round in which
the abort happens is any round other than the first one. So, all we need to handle is the case in which
the sender of the first message (which we assume to be Alice) aborts the game in the first round
(after asking some oracle queries). In the following we focus on this specific cease.
Note that when aborted in the first round Bob can not simply simulate the extended execution
by using fresh randomness to answer his oracle queries in order to decide the output bit. If he does
so it might not be consistent with Alice’s queries asked before aborting and thus it will not be a
good simulation.3 Despite this issues, if we are somehow magically guaranteed that when aborted
in the first round, none of Bob’s queries to compute the output bit collides with Alice’s queries asked
3This will be more clear if one consider the trivial protocol mentioned above which uses a truly random oracle. If
Alice aborts whenever H(0) = 0, and if Bob uses a fresh random answer whenever he gets aborted by Alice, then the
final output will be equal to 1 with probability 3=4 which is clearly a huge bias!
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before, then we can still use fresh random answers to answer Bob’s queries to compute the output
bit.
Suppose after Alice computes her message but right before she sends this message we run the
independence learning algorithm with parameter =(10m). This learning algorithm will announce
a set of O(10m2=) queries and answers conditioned on which any other query has a chance of at
most =(10m) of being asked by Alice in her computation of the first message. Let the set S be
the set of all these O(10m2=) queries and let f(S) be their answers. By the security property of
the learning algorithm, conditioned on S and f(S), an aborted Bob will not ask any query out of S
which collides with Alice’s private queries out of S before aborting (unless with probability at most
O()).
The idea is to sample the set S and f(S) once for all, and hardwire them into the random oracle
and Alice and Bob’s algorithms. This way, simulating Bob’s queries with random answers after
being aborted will not lead to any inconsistency with Alice’s queries unless with probability at most
O(). But if we fix the answer of such queries that might hurt the protocol’s fairness. At this
point we use the fact that the construction is supposed to be fair given any one-way function (and
not necessarily a random function). Any random oracle is one-way with overwhelming probability
even if we fix a subdomain S  f0; 1gn, jSj  poly(n) of its domain and this idea is formalized in
Lemma 3.2.3. Namely, if we hardwire the random function over a subdomain S  f0; 1gn, jSj 
poly(n) we can still use the same exact proof as the case of instant constructions for Theorem 3.4.1
with the only difference that now we will use Lemma 3.2.3 rather than Lemma 3.2.2.
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Part II
Universal Composability and Adaptive
Security
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Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows several mutually distrustful parties to perform a
joint computation without compromising, to the greatest extent possible, the privacy of their inputs
or the correctness of the outputs. In the absence of an honest majority, secure MPC protocols
can only be realized under computational assumptions. The first MPC protocol achieving security
without an honest majority was presented by [Goldreich et al., 1988] and proceeds in the following
two-step paradigm: the first step in the construction is to obtain protocols that are secure against
semi-honest adversaries, and the second step handles malicious behavior by having the parties prove
in zero knowledge that they are adhering to the protocol constructions. This second step requires
the code of the underlying primitive with the use of general NP reductions to prove statements in
zero knowledge.
In their seminal work, Ishai et al. [Ishai et al., 2006] exhibited MPC protocols that are secure
against a static adversary corrupting any number of parties and that rely only on black-box access
to a low-level primitive, such as (enhanced) trapdoor permutations or homomorphic encryption
schemes. This, along with the follow-up work of Haitner [Haitner, 2008], resolves the theoretical
question of the minimal assumptions under which we may obtain black-box constructions of secure
MPC protocols against a static adversary. The main technical contribution in both works is to
construct a secure protocol for a specific two-party functionality, that of oblivious transfer (OT).
The general result then follows from a classic result of Kilian’s [Kilian, 1988] showing that any
multi-party functionality can be securely computed using black-box access to a secure OT protocol.
A natural and challenging problem in the study of secure multi-party computation is to deal
with adaptive adversaries – namely adversaries that may choose which parties to corrupt during
the course of the computation, without having to trust that honest parties can securely erase any
state information. The main tool we have for designing protocols that are secure against adaptive
adversaries is that of non-committing encryption (NCE). Non-committing encryption schemes were
introduced by Canetti, Feige, Goldreich and Naor [Canetti et al., 1996], who used them to simulate
secure channels against an adaptive adversary, thus (by combining with the information theoretically
secure protocol of [Ben-Or et al., 1988]) obtaining a protocol secure against an adaptive adversary
corrupting up to one third of the parties.4 Non-committing encryption has also proved a crucial tool
4More recent work [Damga˚rd and Ishai, 2005] uses standard pseudorandom generators to achieve security against an
adaptive adversary corrupting a minority of the parties.
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in the recent constructions of adaptively secure protocols tolerating a dishonest majority [Canetti et
al., 2002; Katz and Ostrovsky, 2004].
In our work, we revisit the problem of constructing non-committing encryption schemes,
and present a construction of NCE, from a new primitive called trapdoor simulatable PKE,
which simultaneously improves upon all of the previous constructions in [Canetti et al., 1996;
Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000]. More specifically, our scheme enjoys optimal round complexity,
relies on weaker assumptions, and has better efficiency.
Informally, a simulatable PKE is an encryption scheme with special algorithms for obliviously
sampling public keys and random ciphertexts without learning the corresponding secret keys and
plaintexts; in addition, both of these oblivious sampling algorithms should be efficiently invertible.
We define a weaker assumption, which we refer to as trapdoor simulatable cryptosystems, and
prove that it is sufficient for our construction and analysis to go through. Next, we show how
to realize tradoor simulatable cryptosystems from from a variant of Rabin’s trapdoor permutations
(c.f. [Halpern, 1995; Schnorr, 1996; Fischlin and Fischlin, 2002]) based on the hardness of factoring
Blum integers. This yields the first factoring-based non-committing encryption scheme.
NCE is used to construct OT secure against semi-honest, adaptive adversaries which, in
turn, is used to construct protocols for general MPC secure against adaptive adversaries. Thus,
improving the efficiency of NCE is a valuable contribution towards improving the efficiency of
adaptively-secure MPC protocols. Another, perhaps more fundamental, cause of inefficiency
in MPC protocols is the use of generic zero knowledge proofs to ensure semi-honest behavior.
Consequently, an important research goal is to construct adaptively-secure protocols for MPC that
do not require generic zero knowledge proofs. Towards this goal, Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai
[Ishai et al., 2008] recently established an efficient analogue of Kilian’s result that holds even
in the Universal Composability (UC) model against a malicious, adaptive adversary. Thus, they
reduce the problem of finding black-box constructions of MPC protocols in the UC model secure
against a malicious, adaptive adversary to finding black-box constructions of OT protocols in the
UC model secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary. While there has been fairly extensive
work on secure OT protocols against a static malicious adversary (e.g. [Naor and Pinkas, 2001;
Kalai, 2005; Peikert et al., 2008]), very few - namely [Beaver, 1998; Canetti et al., 2002;
Katz and Ostrovsky, 2004] - provide security against an adaptive adversary; moreover, all of
58
those which do follow [Goldreich et al., 1988] paradigm and exploit non-black-box access to the
underlying primitive.
In our work, following the paradigm introduced by [Ishai et al., 2006; Haitner, 2008], we present
a compiler for transforming an OT protocol secure against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary into
one that is secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary. Our compiler achieves security in the UC
model, assuming access to an ideal commitment functionality, and improves over previous work
achieving the same security guarantee in two ways: it uses black-box access to the underlying
protocol and achieves a constant multiplicative overhead in the round complexity. Combining our
two results with the work of [Ishai et al., 2008], we obtain the first black-box construction of UC
and adaptively secure MPC from trapdoor-simulatable PKE and the ideal commitment functionality.
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Chapter 4
Improved Non-Committing Encryption
with Applications to Adaptively Secure
Protocols
4.1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows several mutually distrustful parties to perform a joint
computation without compromising, to the greatest extent possible, the privacy of their inputs or
the correctness of the outputs. An important criterion in evaluating the security guarantee is how
many parties an adversary is allowed to corrupt and when the adversary determines which parties to
corrupt. Ideally, we want to achieve the strongest notion of security, namely, against an adversary
that corrupts an arbitrary number of parties, and adaptively determines who and when to corrupt
during the course of the computation (and without assuming erasures). Even though the latter is a
very natural and realistic assumption about the adversary, most of the MPC literature only addresses
security against a static adversary, namely one that chooses (and fixes) which parties to corrupt
before the protocol starts executing. And if indeed such protocols do exist, it is important to answer
the following question:
What are the cryptographic assumptions under which we can realize MPC
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protocols secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary that may corrupt a
majority of the parties?
Towards answering this question, we revisit the problem of constructing non-committing
encryption schemes, a cryptographic primitive first introduced by Canetti et al. [Canetti et al.,
1996] as a tool for building adaptively secure MPC protocols in the presence of an honest majority.
Informally, non-committing encryption schemes are semantically secure, possibly interactive
encryption schemes, with the additional property that a simulator can generate special ciphertexts
that can be opened to both a 0 and a 1. In a more recent work, Canetti et al. [Canetti et al., 2002]
(extending [Beaver, 1998]) showed how to construct adaptively secure oblivious transfer protocols
starting from non-committing public-key encryption schemes (i.e. the key generation algorithm
must be non-interactive), which may in turn be used to construct MPC protocols secure against a
malicious, adaptive adversary that may corrupt an arbitrary number of parties.
Unfortunately, the only known constructions of non-committing public-key encryption schemes
(PKEs) are based on the CDH and RSA assumptions [Canetti et al., 1996] and the construction
exploits in a very essential way that these assumptions give rise to families of trapdoor permutations
with a common domain. If we allow for an interactive key generation phase, Damga˚rd and Nielsen
[Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000], building on [Beaver, 1997; Canetti et al., 1996], constructed 3-
round non-committing encryption schemes based on a more general assumption, that of simulatable
PKEs, which may in turn be realized from DDH, CDH, RSA and more recently, worst-case lattice
assumptions [Gentry et al., 2008] (see figure 4.1).
4.1.1 Our results
First, we present a new construction of non-committing encryption schemes, which simultaneously
improves upon all of the previous constructions in [Canetti et al., 1996; Damga˚rd and Nielsen,
2000]:
Optimal Round Complexity. We provide a construction of non-committing PKEs from simulatable
cryptosystems. Our construction is surprisingly simple - a twist to the standard cut-and-
choose techniques used in [Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000; Katz and Ostrovsky, 2004] - and
also admits a fairly straight-forward simulation and analysis. In particular, our construction
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and the analysis are conceptually and technically simpler than those in [Canetti et al., 1996;
Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000]; we avoid having to analyze the number of one’s in certain
Binomial distributions as in [Canetti et al., 1996] and to consider a subtle failure mode as in
[Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000].
Reducing the assumptions. Informally, a simulatable PKE is an encryption scheme with special
algorithms for obliviously sampling public keys and random ciphertexts without learning
the corresponding secret keys and plaintexts; in addition, both of these oblivious sampling
algorithms should be efficiently invertible.
We define a weaker assumption, which we refer to as trapdoor simulatable cryptosystems, and
prove that it is sufficient for our construction and analysis to go through. Roughly speaking,
we provide the inverting algorithms in a simulatable cryptosystem with additional trapdoor
information (hence the modifier “trapdoor”), which makes it easier to design a simulatable
cryptosystem.
Improved efficiency. While the main focus of this work is feasibility results (notably, reducing
the computational assumptions for both non-committing encryption schemes and adaptively
secure MPC), we show how to combine a variant of our basic construction with the use
of error-correcting codes to achieve better efficiency. That is, the amortized complexity of
encrypting a single bit is O(1) public-key operations on a constant-sized plaintext in the
underlying cryptosystem.
Thus, we obtain the following.
Theorem 4.1.1 (informal) There exists a black-box construction of a non-committing public-key
encryption scheme, starting from any trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem.
Factoring-based constructions.
Next, we derive trapdoor simulatable cryptosystems from a variant of Rabin’s trapdoor permutations
(c.f. [Halpern, 1995; Schnorr, 1996; Fischlin and Fischlin, 2002]) based on the hardness of factoring
Blum integers.
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CDH, RSA simulatable common-domain TDP 2-round NCE
DDH, LWE simulatable PKE 3-round NCE
factoring BI trapdoor simulatable PKE
Figure 4.1: Summary of previous results (solid lines) along with our contributions (dashed lines).
Theorem 4.1.2 (informal) Suppose factoring Blum integers is hard on average. Then, there exists
a trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem.
We stress that we do not know how to construct a simulatable cryptosystem under the same
assumptions; specifically, inverting the sampling algorithm for ciphertexts in our construction
without the trapdoor (the factorization of the Blum integer modulus) appears to be as hard as
factoring Blum integers. This shows that trapdoor simulatable cryptosystems is indeed a meaningful
and useful relaxation. In the process, we also obtain the first factoring-based dense cryptosystems.1
When combined with enhanced trapdoor permutations, this yields the first factoring-based non-
interactive proofs of knowledge [De Santis and Persiano, 1992].
Oblivious transfer and MPC.
We consider the applications of our main result to the constructions of adaptively secure oblivious
transfer and general MPC protocols in both the stand-alone setting and the UC setting (c.f. [Canetti
et al., 2002; Ishai et al., 2008] and Chapter 5).
Theorem 4.1.3 (informal) There exists a black-box construction of a 6-round 1-out-of-` oblivious
transfer protocol for strings in the FCOM-hybrid model2 in the UC setting that is secure against a
malicious, adaptive adversary, starting from any trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem.
We add that if the oblivious key generation algorithm in the trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem
achieves statistical indistinguishability (which is the case for all of the afore-mentioned construc-
tions), then we obtain an OT protocol that is secure against a computationally unbounded malicious
1These are PKE schemes where a random string has a inverse polynomial probability of being a valid public key.
2 FCOM is an ideal functionality for commitment.
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sender. While our OT protocol is not as efficient as that in the recent work of Garay, Wichs and Zhou
[Garay et al., 2009] (we incur an additional multiplicative overhead that is linear in the security
parameter), our protocol along with our general framework offers several advantages:
 In addition to relying on the FCOM functionality and a simulatable PKE (to implement non-
committing encryption) as in our work, the [Garay et al., 2009] framework requires a so-
called enhanced dual-mode cryptosystem. This is a relatively high-level CRS-based primitive
from [Peikert et al., 2008] augmented with two main additional properties: the first has a
flavor of oblivious sampling; the second requires that the underlying CRS be a common
random string (modulo some system parameters) and not just a common reference string.
This requirement is inherent to their framework, since this CRS is generated using a coin-
tossing protocol. This latter requirement is very restrictive, and the only known construction
of an enhanced dual-mode cryptosystem is based on the quadratic residuocity assumption.
 Our protocol immediately handles 1-out-of-` OT, whereas [Garay et al., 2009] only addresses
1-out-of-2 OT, a limitation inherited from [Peikert et al., 2008]. In addition, our protocol has
exactly 6 rounds, whereas the [Garay et al., 2009] protocol has 6 rounds in expectation.
Combined with [Canetti et al., 2002; Ishai et al., 2008] and the results of Chapter 5, we obtain the
following corollaries:
Corollary 4.1.4 (informal) Assuming the existence of trapdoor simulatable cryptosystems, there
exists adaptively secure multi-party protocols in the stand-alone setting and in the FCOM-hybrid
model in the UC setting against a malicious adversary that may adaptively corrupt any number of
parties.
Specifically, we obtain the first adaptively secure multi-party protocols based on hardness of
factoring in both the stand-alone setting and the UC setting with a common reference string.
4.1.2 Additional related work
The problem of constructing encryption schemes that are secure against adaptive corruptions was
first addressed in the work of Beaver and Haber [Beaver and Haber, 1992]. They considered a
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simpler scenario where the honest parties have the ability to securely and completely erase previous
states. For instance, an honest sender could erase the randomness used for encryption after sending
the ciphertext, so that upon being corrupted, the adversary only gets to see the corresponding
plaintext. An intermediate model, wherein we assume secure erasures for either the sender or
receiver but not both (or, by limiting the adversary to corrupting at most one of the two parties),
has been considered in several other works [Jarecki and Lysyanskaya, 2000; Canetti et al., 2005;
Katz and Ostrovsky, 2004].
4.1.3 Follow-up work
Recently, O’Neill et al. [O’Neill et al., 2011] built upon the techniques presented in Section 4.5 of
this work to construct a variant of non-committing encryption called bi-deniable encryption in the
multi-distributional model. In addition to being non-committing, deniable encryption schemes are
useful since they enable parties to resist coercion.
Organization.
We present an overview of our constructions in Section 4.2, preliminaries in Section 4.3, the
formulation of a trapdoor simulatable PKE in Section 4.4, our factoring-based trapdoor simulatable
PKE in Section 4.6, and our non-committing encryption scheme in Section 4.5. In Section 4.7, we
show the construction of a 6-round oblivious transfer protocol.
4.2 Overview of our constructions
At a high level, our non-committing PKE is similar to that from previous works [Canetti et al., 1996;
Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000; Katz and Ostrovsky, 2004]. The receiver generates a collection of
public keys in such a way that it only knows an  fraction of the corresponding secret keys; this can
be achieved by generating an  fraction of the public keys using the key generation algorithm and
the remaining 1  fraction obliviously. Similarly, the sender generates a collection of ciphertexts in
such a way that it only knows an  fraction of the corresponding plaintexts. Previous constructions
all work with the natural choice of  = 1=2 so that the simulator generates a collection of ciphertexts
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half of which are encryptions of 0 and the other half are encryptions of 1. As noted in [Katz and
Ostrovsky, 2004], this is sufficient for obtaining non-committing PKEs wherein at most one party
is corrupted. Roughly speaking, the difficulty in handling simultaneous corruptions of both the
sender and the receiver with  = 1=2 is that in the simulation, the sender’s choice of the  fraction
of keys completely determine the receiver’s choice of the  fraction of ciphertexts whereas in an
actual honest encryption, these choices are completely independent (we elaborate on this in Section
4.2). The key insight in our construction is to work with a smaller value of  (turns out 1=4 is good
enough).
A toy construction.
Consider the following encryption scheme, which is a simplification of that in [Katz and Ostrovsky,
2004; Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000]. The receiver generates a pair of public keys (PK0; PK1) by
generating one key (selected at random) using the key-generation algorithm, and the other using
the oblivious sampling algorithm. To encrypt a bit b, the sender generates a pair of ciphertexts
(C0; C1) as follows: pick a random bit r, setCr to be EncPKr(b) and chooseC1 r using the oblivious
sampling algorithm. To decrypt, the receiver decrypts exactly one of C0; C1 using the secret key
that it knows. This construction corresponds to  = 1=2 where  is the fraction of public keys for
which the receiver knows the secret key, and also the fraction of ciphertexts for which the sender
knows the plaintext. Observe that this encryption scheme has the following properties:
 It has a constant decryption error of 1=4 if an obliviously sampled ciphertext is equally likely
to decrypt to 0 or 1. As shown in [Katz and Ostrovsky, 2004], this error can be reduced by
standard repetition techniques.
 It tolerates corruption of either the sender or the receiver, but not both. Consider a simulator
that generates both of (PK0; PK1) (along with SK0; SK1) using the key-generation algorithm,
and a ciphertext (C0; C1) as follows: pick a random bit , and set C0 to be EncPK0() and C1
to be EncPK1(1 ). Suppose the simulator later learns that this is an encryption of 0. If only
the sender is corrupted, the simulator claims r =  and that C1  is obliviously sampled. If
only the receiver is corrupted, it claims that it knows SK and that PK1  is oblivious sampled.
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We highlight two subtleties in the above simulation strategy. First, it achieves 0 decryption error
(as opposed to 1=4 in an honest encryption); this can be fixed with a somewhat more involved
simulation strategy. This in turn becomes pretty complicated once we use standard repetition
techniques to reduce the decryption error. Next, it is always the case in the simulation that
either both PK0 and C0 are obliviously sampled, or both PK1 and C1 are obliviously sampled. As
such, this simulation strategy fails if both the sender and the receiver are corrupted, because in an
actual encryption, which of PK0; PK1 and which of C0; C1 are obliviously sampled are determined
independently.
Our encryption scheme.
As noted in the introduction, the key insight in our construction is to work with a small value of .
In addition, following [Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000], we use a random k-bit encoding of 0 and 1,
where k is the security parameter:
 The receiver generates 4k public keys PK1; : : : ; PK4k: k of them are generated using the
key-generation algorithm, and the remaining 3k are generated using the oblivious sampling
algorithm. The receiver then sends PK1; : : : ; PK4k along with two random k-bit messages
M0;M1.
 To encrypt a bit b, the sender sends 4k ciphertexts (one for each of PK1; : : : ; PK4k), of which
k are encryptions ofMb, and the remaining ones are obliviously sampled.
 To decrypt, the receiver decrypts the k ciphertexts for which it knows the corresponding secret
key. If any of the k plaintexts matchesM0, it outputs 0 and otherwise, it outputs 1.
Encoding 0 and 1 randomly asM0 andM1 is useful for two reasons:
 That an obliviously sampled ciphertext is equally likely to decrypt to 0 or 1 is no longer
needed to guarantee correctness (c.f. [Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000]). Indeed, reasoning about
decryptions of obliviously sampled ciphertext is non-trivial for the lattice-based simulatable
PKEs in [Gentry et al., 2008].
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 Constructing a simulator becomes much easier as we avoid having to generate distributions
over k independent biased bits conditioned on the majority of the bits being 0, say. Generating
such distributions arises for instance in [Canetti et al., 1996] and is related to the first
subtlety associated with the naive simulation strategy. In our construction, the simulated
ciphertext comprises k encryptions ofM0, k encryptions ofM1, and 2k obliviously generated
ciphertexts. Having these extra 2k obliviously generated ciphertexts (which is possible
because  < 1=2) is crucial for handling simultaneous corruptions of the sender and the
receiver.
Trapdoor Simulatable PKEs from factoring.
Our factoring-based trapdoor simulatable PKE construction consists of two main steps. First, we
modify the Rabin trapdoor permutations based on squaring modulo Blum integer so that it remains
a permutation over any arbitrary integer modulus. This relies on the following number-theoretical
structural lemma implicit in [Halpern, 1995; Schnorr, 1996; Fischlin and Fischlin, 2002]3:
Let N be an arbitrary odd k-bit integer, and let QN = fa2k (mod N) j a 2 ZNg.
Then, the map  : x 7! x2 defines a permutation over QN .
We also provide an efficient algorithm for inverting  given the factorization of N . Note that
the standard algorithm for computing square roots does not guarantee that the output lies in QN .
Moreover, the probability that a random square root lies in QN may be exponential small so we
cannot repeatedly computing random square roots until we find one in QN ; it’s also not clear a-
priori how to test membership in QN even given the factorization of N .
The next step transforms the family of trapdoor permutations  acting on the domain QN
into a family of “enhanced” trapdoor permutations with the same domain QN , using an idea from
[Goldreich, 2004, Section C.1]. The latter has the property that we can obliviously sample a random
element y in QN so that given y along with the coin tosses used to sample y, it is infeasible to
compute the preimage of y under the permutation (note that the naive algorithm for sampling a
3 It was shown in [Halpern, 1995] that  defines a permutation over the subgroup ON of ZN of odd order, and that
ON contains QN ; turns out ON = QN . While QN is trivially sampleable, it is not clear a-priori how to sample from
ON .
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random element of QN gives away its preimage under  ). We will need the oblivious sampling
algorithm for a random element in QN in our oblivious sampling algorithm for random ciphertexts.
We will also need to realize trapdoor invertibility for the latter, which requires an efficient algorithm
that given the factorization of N and an element y in QN , outputs a random 2k’th root of y.4 Note
that iteratively computing random square roots k times does not work: after computing the first
square root, we may not end up with a 2k 1’th power.
4.3 Preliminaries
IfA is a probabilistic polynomial time (hereafter, ppt) algorithm that runs on input x, A(x) denotes
the random variable according to the distribution of the output of A on input x. We denote by
A(x; r) the output ofA on input x and random coins r. To simplify the notation, we will often omit
quantifying over the distribution for r; it will usually be clear from the context when r is not fixed,
that it is drawn from the uniform distribution over strings of the appropriate length.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the standard definitions of public-key encryption
schemes and semantic security (c.f. [Goldwasser and Micali, 1984; Goldreich, 2004]). We stress
that we allow decryption errors that are exponentially small in k:
Definition 4.3.1 (encryption scheme) A triple (Gen;Enc;Dec) is an encryption scheme, if Gen
and Enc are ppt algorithms andDec is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm such that for every
message m 2 f0; 1g of polynomial length, Pr[Gen(1k) ! (PK; SK);EncPK(m) ! c;DecSK(c) 6=
m] < 2 
(k).
4.3.0.1 Non-committing encryption.
For simplicity, we present the definition of a non-committing public-key encryption scheme for
single-bit messages:
Definition 4.3.2 (non-committing encryption [Canetti et al., 1996]) A non-committing (bit) en-
cryption scheme consists of a tuple (NCGen;NCEnc;NCDec;NCSim)where (NCGen;NCEnc;NCDec)
4If we are given just N and not its factorization, this problem is at least as hard is factoring random Blum integers.
This is in essence why we only obtain a factoring-based trapdoor simulatable PKE and not a simulatable PKE.
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is an encryption scheme and NCSim is the simulation algorithm that on input 1k, outputs
(e; c; 0G; 
0
E ; 
1
G; 
1
E) with the following property: for b = 0; 1 the following distributions are
computationally indistinguishable:
 the joint view of an honest sender and an honest receiver in a normal encryption of b:
f(e; c; G; E) j (e; d) = NCGen(1k;G); c = NCEnce(b;E)g
 simulated view of an encryption of b:
f(e; c; bG; bE) j NCSim(1k)! (e; c; 0G; 0E ; 1G; 1E)g
It follows from the definition that a non-committing encryption scheme is also semantically secure.
Encrypting longer messages. Starting with a non-committing bit encryption scheme (NCGen;
NCEnc; NCDec; NCSim), we may encrypt a longer message of length n by generating n
independent public keys using NCGen, encrypting each bit of the message using a different key
and then concatenating the n ciphertexts. Note that this is different from the case of semantically
secure encryption, where we may encrypt each bit using the same public key.
4.4 Trapdoor Simulatable Public Key Encryption
A `-bit trapdoor simulatable encryption scheme consists of an encryption scheme (Gen;Enc;Dec)
augmented with (oGen; oRndEnc; rGen; rRndEnc). Here, oGen and oRndEnc are the oblivious
sampling algorithms for public keys and ciphertexts, and rGen and rRndEnc are the respective
inverting algorithms5. We require that, for all messagesm 2 f0; 1g`, the following distributions are
5 Existence of such inverting algorithms is called trapdoor invertibility. Compared to the simulatable cryptosystem
(without trapdoor) defined in [Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000], rGen (resp. rRndEnc) takes rG (resp. (rG; rE;m)) as the
additional trapdoor information.
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computationally indistinguishable:
frGen(rG); rRndEnc(rG; rE;m); PK; c j (PK; SK) = Gen(1k; rG); c = EncPK(m; rE)g
and fr^G; r^E; P^K; c^ j (P^K;?) = oGen(1k; r^G); c^ = oRndEncP^K(1k; r^E)g
It follows from the definition that a trapdoor simulatable encryption scheme is also semantically
secure.
Encrypting longer messages. We note that if we started only with a trapdoor simulatable PKE
for single bits, we may encrypt a longer message of length n by generating a single public key PK
using Gen, and concatenating each of the message encrypted under PK.
4.5 Non-Committing Encryption from Weaker Assumptions
Theorem 4.5.1 Suppose there exists a trapdoor simulatable encryption scheme. Then, there exists a
non-committing encryption scheme as well as a universally composable oblivious transfer protocol
secure against semi-honest, adaptive adversaries.
We show how to construct a non-committing bit encryption scheme (NCGen, NCEnc, NCDec,
NCSim) from a k-bit trapdoor simulatable PKE (Gen;Enc;Dec) (augmented with (oGen; oRndEnc;
rGen; rRndEnc)). This is sufficient to establish the theorem by the connection between encrypting
single bits and multiple bits as discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Our construction is presented in
Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
4.5.1 Correctness.
We begin by establishing correctness.
 Assume that the input [c1; : : : ; c4k] to the decryption algorithm is a random encryption of 0.
Recall that J = fDecSKi(ci) j i 2 Tg and we will output 0 unlessM0 =2 J . It is easy to see
that Pr[M0 =2 J ] 
 
3k
k

=
 
4k
k

+ 2 
(k) where the first summand comes from the probability
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Key Generation NCGen(1k):
1. PickM0;M1 at random from f0; 1gk.
2. Choose a random subset T  [4k] of size k.
3. For i = 1; 2; : : : ; 4k, generate a pair (PKi; SKi) as follows:
(PKi; SKi) =
(
Gen(1k) if i 2 T
oGen(1k) otherwise
Set e = [M0;M1; PK1; : : : ; PK4k] and d = [T; SK1; : : : ; SK4k].
Encryption NCEncPK(b):
1. Choose a random subset S  [4k] of size k.
2. For i = 1; 2; : : : ; 4k, generate a ciphertext ci as follows:
ci =
(
EncPKi(Mb) if i 2 S
oRndEncPKi(1
k) otherwise
Set c = [c1; : : : ; c4k].
Decryption NCDecPK(c):
1. Compute J = fDecPKi(ci)ji 2 Tg.
2. IfM0 2 J , output 0; else, output 1.
Figure 4.2: Non-Committing Encryption Scheme (NCGen;NCEnc;NCDec)
that S \ T = ; and the second bounds the probability of a decryption error in the underlying
encryption scheme (Gen;Enc;Dec).
 Assume that the input [c1; : : : ; c4k] to the decryption algorithm is a random encryption of
1. Recall that J = fDecSKi(ci) j i 2 Tg and we will output 1 unless M0 2 J . To
bound Pr[M0 2 J ], observe that the distribution of J depends only on M1; PK1; : : : ; PK4n,
T; SK1; : : : ; SK4n and the coin tosses used to generate c1; : : : ; c4k, and is therefore indepen-
dent of the choice of a random M0. This means that for each i 2 T , the probability that
DecSKi(ci) equalsM0 is 2
 k. Taking a union bound, we obtain Pr[M0 2 J ]  k  2 k.
4.5.2 Security.
We need to show that for each b = 0; 1, a normal encryption of b and a simulated encryption of b
are computationally indistinguishable. Note that the view in a normal encryption of b contains two
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Simulation NCSim:
1. PickM0;M1 at random from f0; 1gk.
2. Picking the sets S0; S1; T0; T1:
 Pick two random subsets S0; T0 of [4k] each of size k.
 Pick two random subsets S1; T1 of [4k] n (S0 [ T0) such that jS1 \ T1j = jS0 \ T0j.
3. Generating the keys: for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 4k, set
(PKi; SKi) =
(
Gen(1k; riG) if i 2 T0 [ S0 [ T1 [ S1
oGen(1k; r^iG) otherwise
4. Generating the ciphertext: for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 4k, set
ci =
8><>:
EncPKi(M0; r
i
E) if i 2 S0
EncPKi(M1; r
i
E) if i 2 S1
oRndEncPKi(r^
i
E) otherwise
5. Simulating an opening to b: set bG = fTb; ub;1G ; : : : ; ub;4kG g and bE = fSb; ub;1E ; : : : ; ub;4kE g,
where
ub;iG =
8><>:
riG if i 2 Tb
rGen(riG) if i 2 T0 [ T1 [ S0 [ S1 n Tb
r^iG otherwise
ub;iE =
8><>:
riE if i 2 Sb
rRndEnc(riG; r
i
E;M1 b) if i 2 S1 b
r^iE otherwise
Set e = [M0;M1; PK1; : : : ; PK4k]; c = [c1; : : : ; c4k]. Additionally output 0G; 
0
E ; 
1
G; 
1
E .
Figure 4.3: Non-Committing Encryption Scheme NCSim
sets T; S which we will label as Tb; Sb and we will append to the view two sets T1 b; S1 b that are
determined as follows: pick two random subsets S1 b; T1 b of [4k]n (Sb[Tb) such that jS1\T1j =
jS0 \ T0j; call this distribution H0. We will also append to the view in a simulated encryption of
b the sets T1 b; S1 b as determined by the experiment NCSim; call this distribution H4k. We will
show that the augmented distributions H0 and H4k are computationally indistinguishable in two
steps:
Reasoning about the sets. First, we claim that the 4-tuple (S0; T0; S1; T1) in the augmented
distributionH0 and inH4k are identically distributed. If b = 0, this is obvious since the distributions
are defined in exactly the same way. The case for b = 1 follows from a symmetry argument,
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namely that if we switch (S0; T0) with (S1; T1) in the experiment NCSim, we get exactly the same
distribution. Henceforth, it suffices to argue thatH0 andH4k are computationally indistinguishable,
conditioned on some fixed (S0; T0; S1; T1) in both H0 and H4k. We may now WLOG focus on
the case b = 0. In fact, we may as well also fix M0;M1 in both H0 and H4k. In addition to
S0; T0; S1; T1;M0;M1, the distributionsH0;H4k comprise:
 4k public keys PK1; : : : ; PK4k (generated using either Gen or oGen);
 4k ciphertexts c1; : : : ; c4k (generated using either Enc or oRndEnc);
 4k sets of coin tosses u1G; : : : ; u4kG for generating the public/secret keys; and
 4k sets of coin tosses u1E; : : : ; u4kE for generating the ciphertexts.
That is, we have 4k tuples of the form (PKi; ci; uiG; u
i
E); i = 1; : : : ; 4k in each view. Since
S0; T0; S1; T1 are fixed, each of these 4k tuples are independently sampled from some distribution
that only depends on the index i. Denote by X1; : : : ; X4k the random variables for the 4k tuples in
H0, and Y1; : : : ; Y4k the random variables for the 4k tuples in H4k.
The hybrid argument. Next, we argue that Xi and Yi are computationally indistinguishable for
i = 1; : : : ; 4k, from which the indistinguishability of H0 and H4k follows via a hybrid argument.
There are several cases we need to consider:
 i 2 T0 or i 2 [4k] n (T0 [ S0 [ T1 [ S1). It is easy to verify that in either of these cases, Xi
and Yi are identically distributed.
 i 2 S1 (“oGen; oRndEnc = Gen;Enc”). Here, Xi is the distribution
fP^K; c^; r^G; r^E j (P^K;?) = oGen(r^G); c^ = oRndEncP^K(r^E)g
and Yi is the distribution
fPK; c; rGen(rG); rRndEnc(rG; rE;M1) j (PK; SK) = Gen(rG); c = EncPK(M1; rE)g:
Indistinguishability follows immediately from the security of the trapdoor simulatable PKE.
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 i 2 S0 n T0 (“oGen;Enc = Gen;Enc”). Here, Xi is the distribution
fP^K; c; r^G; rE j (P^K;?) = oGen(r^G); c = EncP^K(M0; rE)g
and Yi is the distribution
fPK; c; rGen(rG); rE j (PK; SK) = Gen(rG); c = EncPK(M0; rE)g:
Indistinguishability follows again from the security of the trapdoor simulatable PKE.
 i 2 T1 n S1 (“oGen; oRndEnc = Gen; oRndEnc”). Here, Xi is the distribution
fP^K; c^; r^G; r^E j (P^K;?) = oGen(r^G); c^ = oRndEncP^K(r^E)g
and Yi is the distribution
fPK; c^; rGen(rG); r^E j (PK; SK) = Gen(rG); c^ = oRndEncPK(r^E)g:
Indistinguishability follows again from the security of the trapdoor simulatable PKE.
4.5.3 Improving the efficiency.
Instead of using sets S; T  [4k] of size k, we choose S; T  [40] of size 10. The previous analysis
still goes through, except we now have a constant decryption error. To address this problem, we
first encode the message6 with a linear-rate error-correcting code that corrects a constant fraction of
errors, and then encrypt the codeword with the encryption scheme with constant error.
4.6 Trapdoor Simulatable PKE from Hardness of Factoring
Theorem 4.6.1 Suppose factoring Blum integers is hard on average, and that Blum integers are
dense, then there exists a trapdoor simulatable PKE.
6 The codeword length (or, equivalently the message length) should be 
(k). Then, by Chernoff bound, the number
of decryption errors remains a constant fraction of the codeword length with overwhelming probability.
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For simplicity, we only present a 1-bit trapdoor simulatable encryption scheme; we may encrypt
longer messages by encrypting bit by bit.
4.6.1 A number-theoretic lemma.
Fix any k-bit integer modulus N and we will work with the group ZN . We will use factor(N) to
denote the factorization of N , and we define QN = fa2k j a 2 ZNg. Now, consider the map
 N : QN ! QN given by  N (x) = x2 (mod N). As shown in [Halpern, 1995, Facts 3.5-3.7],
 N defines a permutation on QN . We provide a more direct proof which also yields an efficient
algorithm to invert  N given factor(N).
Claim 4.6.2 The map  N defines a permutation on QN .
Proof: Let q denote the largest odd divisor of (N), where () is the Euler’s totient function. It
is easy to see that (N) divides 2kq, since N < 2k. Take any y 2 QN , where y = a2k . Then by
Euler’s theorem, yq = 1 (mod N) and thus  N (y(q+1)=2) = y (mod N). Clearly, y(q+1)=2 2 QN ,
so the map  N is surjective. Moreover, the range and domain of  N have equal sizes, so  N must
define a bijection.
4.6.2 The construction.
We sketch the construction here; the formal construction is shown in Figure 4.4.
STEP 1: First, we construct a family of “weakly one-way” enhanced trapdoor permutations.
We start by modifying  N to obtain a new family of permutations N ; the modification is
analogous to that in [Goldreich, 2004, Section C.1] to obtain enhanced trapdoor permutations
from Rabin’s trapdoor permutations. The permutations N : QN ! QN are indexed by a
k-bit integer N and is given by:
N (x)
def
=  k+1N (x) = x
2k+1 (mod N)
and the trapdoor is factor(N). We may sample from this family by running Bach’s algorithm
[Bach, 1988; Kalai, 2002] to pick a random k-bit integer along with its factorization.
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It is easy to verify N is a family of trapdoor permutations. Clearly, N is a permutation
because it is the (k + 1)-fold iterate of a permutation  N . Given the index N , N
is efficiently computable by repeated squaring. Given the trapdoor factor(N),  1N is
efficiently computable given factor(N), by simply mapping y to y((q+1)=2)
k+1
, i.e., raising
y to the (q + 1)=2’th power k + 1 times. Here, q denotes the largest odd divisor of
(N), which is easy to compute with the trapdoor. Moreover, we can show that if N
is a Blum integer (which occurs with probability 
(1=k2) [Granville and Martin, 2004;
Rubinstein and Sarnak, 1994]), then inverting N given N is at least as hard as factoring
N . This implies that N is one-way with probability 
(1=k2) over the choice of N .
STEP 2: Construct a “weak” encryption scheme using the standard construction of PKE from
trapdoor permutations via the Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicate. The public key is N , the
secret key is factor(N), and to encrypt a bit b, we pick a random x 2 QN ; r 2 f0; 1gk and
output (N (x); r; (x  r) b), where x  r is the standard dot-product of k-bit strings. Again,
this scheme will be semantically secure with probability 
(1=k2) over the choice of N .
STEP 3: To boost the security of the “weak” encryption scheme, we define a new scheme where
the public key is k3 random k-bit strings N1; : : : ; Nk3 (with overwhelming probability, one
of these is a Blum integer), and to encrypt a bit b, we pick random b1; : : : ; bk3 such that
b = b1      bk3 and concatenate the encryptions of b1; : : : ; bk3 under the respective public
keys N1; : : : ; Nk3 . By a standard argument (c.f. [Yao, 1982; De Santis and Persiano, 1992]),
this encryption scheme is semantically secure in the standard sense.
4.6.3 Analysis.
Indeed, we claim something stronger – that the encryption scheme derived in Step 3 is a trapdoor
simulatable PKE.
 (Oblivious sampling & trapdoor invertibility for key generation) This is trivial, since a random
public key corresponds to a string in f0; 1g4k. We can clearly sample such a public key
without learning the secret key.
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 (Oblivious sampling & trapdoor invertibility for random ciphertext) For simplicity, we present
the algorithms for sampling random ciphertext for the scheme obtained in Step 2. Here,
sampling is easy: on input the public key N , pick  2 ZN ; s 2 f0; 1gk;  2 f0; 1g)
and output (2
k
; s; ). To implement reverse sampling, we need an efficient algorithm that
given factor(N) and x 2 QN , output a random element of the set f 2 ZN j 2
k
=
N (x) = x
2k+1g. This can be accomplished as follows: pick a random  2 ZN and output
x2  =(2k)((q+1)=2)k , where q is as before the largest odd divisor of (N). This works
because =(2
k
)((q+1)=2)
k
will be a random 2k’th root of 1 (mod N).
For the actual proof of security, we will need to show that if N is a random Blum integer, then the
following distributions are computationally indistinguishable for every b:
f(N; ; N (x); r; (x  r) b)g and f(N; ; 2k ; r; )g
The first distribution corresponds to an encryption of b using modulus N and randomness (x; r)
along with  the output of rRndEnc (a random solution to the equation 2
k
= N (x)). The
second corresponds to an obliviously generated ciphertext along with the randomness. If there
exists an efficient distinguisher, then there exists an efficient procedureA that on inputN; , outputs
 1N (
2k) with noticeable probability. Since squaring is a bijection on quadratic residues modulo
Blum integers, the output ofA is also the 4th root of 2. We may then use a reduction in [Goldreich,
2004, Section C.1] to derive from A an algorithm for factoring N with noticeable probability.
4.7 Oblivious Transfer and MPC
We describe the construction underlying Theorem 4.1.3, which proceeds in two steps:
STEP 1: We begin with the [Canetti et al., 2002] construction of a semi-honest OT protocol as
applied to our non-committing encryption scheme, and observe that the protocol is secure
against malicious senders. For that, we just need to show how to extract the sender’s input
when the receiver is honest. In this case, the simulator will generate the public keys sent
by the receiver in the first message along with the secret keys, so that it can then extract the
malicious sender’s input by decrypting.
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STEP 2: Next, we apply the compiler presented in Chapter 5 to “boost” the security guarantee
from tolerating semi-honest receivers to tolerating malicious receivers. (Note that we will not
need to apply OT reversal as in Chapter 5.)
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Key generation Gen(1k):
1. Run Bach’s algorithm using the randomness rG to sample random N1; : : : ; Nk3 2 f0; 1gk
along with their factorization factor(N1); : : : ; factor(Nk3).
2. Set PK = [N1; : : : ; Nk3 ] and SK = [factor(N1); : : : ; factor(Nk3)].
Encryption Enc(b):
1. Parse the randomness rE as (a1; : : : ; ak3) 2 ZN1      ZNk3 , r1; : : : ; rk3 2 f0; 1gk and
b1; : : : ; bk3 1 2 f0; 1g.
2. Compute bk3 = b b1      bk3 1.
3. Compute xi = a2
k
i 2 QNi ; i = 1; : : : ; k3.
4. Output [Ni(xi); ri; (xi  ri) bi; i = 1; : : : ; k3].
Decryption Dec(c):
1. Parse c as [yi; ri; i; i = 1; : : : ; k3].
2. Compute bi = ( 1Ni (yi)  ri) i; i = 1; : : : ; k3.
3. Output b1      bk3 .
Oblivious key generation oGen(1k):
1. Parse the randomness r^G 2 f0; 1gk4 as N1; : : : ; Nk3 2 f0; 1gk.
2. Output (N1; : : : ; Nk3).
Trapdoor invertibility key generation rGen(rG):
1. Run Gen(rG) to obtain r^G = (N1; : : : ; Nk3).
2. Output r^G.
Oblivious sampling of ciphertexts oRndEnc(1k):
1. Parse the randomness r^E as (1; : : : ; k3) 2 ZN1      ZNk3 , s1; : : : ; sk3 2 f0; 1gk and
1; : : : ; k3 2 f0; 1g.
2. Compute yi = 2
k
i 2 QNi ; i = 1; : : : ; k3.
3. Output [yi; si; i; i = 1; : : : ; k3].
Trapdoor invertibility for ciphertexts rRndEnc(rG; rE; b):
1. Use rG to compute factor(N1); : : : ; factor(Nk). and parse rE as in Enc.
2. Set si = ri and i = (xi  ri) bi, i = 1; : : : ; k3.
3. Pick a random i uniformly from the set fi 2 ZNi j 2
k
i = Ni(xi)g.
4. Output r^E = (1; : : : ; k3 ; s1; : : : ; sk3 ; 1; : : : ; k3).
Figure 4.4: Trapdoor Simulatable PKE from hardness of factoring Blum integers
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Chapter 5
Simple, Black-Box Constructions of
Adaptively Secure Protocols
5.1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows several mutually distrustful parties to perform a joint
computation without compromising, to the greatest extent possible, the privacy of their inputs or
the correctness of the outputs. An important criterion in evaluating the security guarantee is how
many parties an adversary is allowed to corrupt and when the adversary determines which parties
to corrupt. In this work, we focus on MPC protocols secure against an adversary that corrupts an
arbitrary number of parties, and in addition, adaptively determines who and when to corrupt during
the course of the computation. Even though the latter is a very natural and realistic assumption
about the adversary, most of the MPC literature only addresses security against a static adversary,
namely one that chooses (and fixes) which parties to corrupt before the protocol starts executing.
In the absence of an honest majority, secure MPC protocols can only be realized under
computational assumptions. From both a theoretical and practical stand-point, it is desirable for
these protocols to be based on general hardness assumptions, and in addition, to require only
black-box access to the primitive guaranteed by the assumption (that is, the protocol refers only
to the input/output behavior of the primitive). Indeed, the first MPC protocols achieving security
without an honest majority [Goldreich et al., 1988] require non-black-box access to the underlying
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cryptographic primitives: the first step in the construction is to obtain protocols that are secure
against semi-honest adversaries, and the second handles malicious behavior by having the parties
prove in zero knowledge that they are adhering to the protocol constructions. It is the second
step that requires the code of the underlying primitive with the use of general NP reductions to
prove statements in zero knowledge. This aversely affects both computational complexity and
communication complexity of the resulting protocol as well as the complexity of implementing
the protocol.
In their seminal work, Ishai et al. [Ishai et al., 2006] exhibited MPC protocols that are secure
against a static adversary corrupting any number of parties and that rely only on black-box access
to a low-level primitive, such as (enhanced) trapdoor permutations and homomorphic encryption
schemes. This, along with the follow-up work of Haitner [Haitner, 2008], resolves the theoretical
question of the minimal assumptions under which we may obtain black-box constructions of secure
MPC protocols against a static adversary1. The main technical contribution in both works is to
construct a secure protocol for a specific two-party functionality, that of oblivious transfer (OT).
The general result then follows from a classic result of Kilian’s [Kilian, 1988] showing that any
multi-party functionality can be securely computed using black-box access to a secure OT protocol.
However, none of these works addresses security against an adaptive adversary, which begs the
following question:
Is it possible to construct MPC protocols secure against a malicious,
adaptive adversary that may corrupt any number of parties, given only black-
box access to a low-level primitive?
Towards resolving this question, Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai [Ishai et al., 2008] established an
analogue of Kilian’s result for an adaptive adversary. While there has been fairly extensive work on
secure OT protocols against a static malicious adversary (e.g. [Naor and Pinkas, 2001; Kalai, 2005;
Peikert et al., 2008]), very few - namely [Beaver, 1998; Canetti et al., 2002; Katz and Ostrovsky,
2004] - provide security against an adaptive adversary; moreover, all of those which do follow the
[Goldreich et al., 1988] paradigm and exploit non-black-box access to the underlying primitive.
1We note that subsequently, the works of [Ishai et al., 2006] and [Haitner, 2008] were combined in a journal version
[Haitner et al., 2011], which we refer to henceforth.
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5.1.1 Our results
Our main technical contribution is the construction of efficient OT protocols that achieve security
against an adaptive adversary, while relying only upon black-box access to some low-level primitive.
Specifically, we provide a compiler that transforms an OT protocol secure against a semi-honest,
adaptive adversary into one that is secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary, given only black-
box access to the underlying OT protocol and an “ideal” commitment scheme. In addition, we
achieve security in the universal composability (UC) model, where a protocol may be executed
concurrently with an unknown number of other protocols [Canetti, 2001]. This is a notable
improvement over afore-mentioned works of Ishai et al. [Haitner et al., 2011] which provide a
compiler for semi-honest OT to malicious OT, but only for static adversaries in the stand-alone
model.2
Theorem 5.1.1 There exists a black-box construction of a protocol that UC realizes OT against
a malicious, adaptive adversary in the FCOM-hybrid model, starting from any protocol that UC
realizes OT against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary.3 Moreover, the construction achieves a
constant multiplicative blow-up in the number of rounds.
We note that there are two models for adaptive corruptions: with and without secure erasures, and
our result applies to both models.
Our construction also improves upon the earlier work of Canetti et. al [Canetti et al.,
2002] achieving the same guarantee; their construction is non-black-box and incurs a blow-
up in round complexity proportional to the depth of the circuit computing the semi-honest
OT protocol. Combined with the 2-round semi-honest OT protocol in [Canetti et al., 2002;
Choi et al., 2009a], we obtain the first constant-round protocol for OT in the FCOM-hybrid model
secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary.4 Moreover, the protocol uses black-box access to a
2We note that our construction does not improve on the computational complexity of the previous compiler, as
measured by the number of invocations of the underlying semi-honest OT protocol. However, we believe our construction
may be combined with the OT extension protocol in [Ishai et al., 2008, Section 5.3] to achieve better efficiency.
3In both the semi-honest and the malicious OT protocols, we allow the adaptive adversary to corrupt both the sender
and the receiver.
4In an independent work [Garay et al., 2009], Garay, Wichs and Zhou also constructed a constant-round protocol for
OT in the common reference string model, secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary. Their underlying assumptions
are comparatively more restrictive.
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Functionality FCOM
1. Upon receiving input (commit; sid; Pj ; x) from Pi where x 2 f0; 1gm, internally record
the tuple (Pi; Pj ; x) and send the message (sid; Pi; Pj) to the adversary; When receiving
(ok) from the adversary, output (receipt; sid; Pi) to Pj . Ignore all subsequent (commit; :::)
inputs.
2. Upon receiving a value (reveal; sid) from Pi, where a tuple (Pi; Pj ; x) is recorded, send
(x) to the adversary; When receiving (ok) from the adversary, output (reveal; sid; x) to Pj .
Figure 5.1: String Commitment Functionality
Functionality FOT
1. Upon receiving input (receiver; sid; r) from R where sid = (S;R; sid0) and r 2 f0; 1g,
record the tuple (sid; r) and send (recevier; sid) to S and the adversary.
2. Upon receiving input (sender; sid; s0; s1) from S where sid = (S;R; sid0) and s0; s1 2
f0; 1g`, send (output; sid; sr) to R and (output; sid) to the adversary and halt. If no
(receiver; sid; : : :) message was previously sent, ignore the message.
Figure 5.2: Oblivious Transfer Functionality
low-level primitive, that of trapdoor simulatable cryptosystems5, which may in turn be based on the
RSA, DDH, worst-case lattice assumptions or hardness of factoring.
The key conceptual insight underlying the construction is to view the [Haitner et al., 2011]
compiler as an instantiation of the [Goldreich et al., 1988] paradigm in the FCOM-hybrid model,
except enforcing consistency via cut-and-choose techniques instead of using zero-knowledge
proofs. This perspective leads naturally to a simpler, more modular, and more direct analysis
of the previous compiler for static adversaries. In addition, we immediately obtain a string OT
protocol, which is important for obtaining round-efficient MPC protocols [Lindell and Pinkas, 2007;
Ishai et al., 2008]. Showing that the modified compiler achieves UC security against an adaptive
adversary requires new insight in constructing a simulator and in the analysis. We defer a more
detailed discussion of the construction to Section 5.2, and instead focus here on the applications to
secure MPC derived by combining our OT protocol with various MPC protocols in the FOT-hybrid
model in [Ishai et al., 2008].
5Trapdoor simulatable cryptosystems are introduced in [Choi et al., 2009a], as a relaxation of simulatable
cryptosystems [Damga˚rd and Nielsen, 2000]. These are semantically secure encryption schemes with special algorithms
for “obliviously” sampling public keys and ciphertexts without learning the respective secret keys and plaintexts. In
addition, both of these oblivious sampling algorithms are efficiently invertible given the corresponding secret key.
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MPC in the FCOM-hybrid model.
Combining our OT protocol with [Ishai et al., 2008, Theorem 2], we obtain UC-secure MPC
protocols in the FCOM-hybrid model against a malicious, adaptive adversary, which improves upon
[Canetti et al., 2002] in that we only require black-box access to the underlying primitive:
Theorem 5.1.2 There exists a protocol in the FCOM-hybrid model that uses black-box access to
a (trapdoor) simulatable cryptosystem and UC realizes any well-formed multi-party functionality
against a malicious, adaptive adversary that may corrupt any number of parties.
The round complexity of the protocol is proportional to the depth of the circuit computing the
functionality. By combining our OT protocol with [Ishai et al., 2008, Theorem 3], we obtain a
constant-round MPC protocol in the FCOM with the same guarantees, except that the adversary is
limited to corrupting up tom  1 parties for am-party functionality.
The advantage of constructing UC-secure MPC protocols in the FCOM-hybrid model is that they
may be combined with many of the existing UC feasibility results under various set-up or modeling
assumptions e.g. [Canetti et al., 2002; Barak et al., 2004; Canetti et al., 2007; Katz, 2007], almost
all of which start by showing how to UC realize FCOM in some new security model6. Moreover, if
the protocol realizing FCOM uses black-box access to a low-level primitive, so will the combined
protocol.
With a slight modification to our compiler Comp(), we obtain an analogous result for the case
where we start with  that is secure against semi-honest, static adversaries and end with Comp()
secure against malicious, static adversaries. Combining our OT protocol with [Ishai et al., 2008,
Theorem 2], as before, we obtain UC-secure MPC protocols in the FCOM-hybrid model against a
malicious, static adversary:
Theorem 5.1.3 There exists a protocol in the FCOM-hybrid model that uses black-box access to an
(enhanced) trapdoor permutation and UC realizes any well-formed multi-party functionality against
a malicious, static adversary that may corrupt any number of parties.
6This is because it is impossible to UC realize any non-trivial 2-party functionality in the plain model (even against
static adversaries) [Canetti et al., 2003; Canetti, 2001].
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MPC in the standalone model.
Next, we present our results for the stand-alone model with adaptive post-execution corruptions
[Canetti, 2000], which is a weaker notion of security than UC security with adaptive corruptions
(and in particular, our protocols in the FCOM-hybrid model achieve this notion of security). Here,
there is a two-party protocol that uses black-box access to a one-way function and securely realizes
FCOM in the plain model without any set-up assumptions [Pass and Wee, 2009]. This yields the
following corollaries (via the composition theorem in [Canetti, 2000]):
Corollary 5.1.4 There exists a constant-round string OT protocol that uses black-box access to a
(trapdoor) simulatable cryptosystem and is secure in the stand-alone model against a malicious,
adaptive adversary.
Corollary 5.1.5 There exists a protocol that uses black-box access to a (trapdoor) simulatable
cryptosystem and securely computes any well-formed multi-party functionality in the stand-alone
model against a malicious, adaptive adversary that may corrupt any number of parties.
Both of these results hold in the setting without erasures and improve on the work of Beaver
[Beaver, 1998] which achieve similar security guarantees but with non-black-box access to the
underlying primitive. Furthermore, if we assume secure erasures, then we may relax the assumption
in both results to any (constant-round) semi-honest OT protocol against static adversaries. Here, we
also rely on a result of Lindell’s that transforms a semi-honest OT protocol against static adversaries
into one that is secure against adaptive adversaries with secure erasures [Lindell, 2009].
5.1.2 Follow-up work
A variant of our compiler and simulation strategy was used in the follow-up works of Wee [Wee,
2010] and Goyal [Goyal, 2011] to obtain black-box, constant-round protocols for secure multi-party
computation in the stand-alone model.
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5.2 Construction
5.2.1 High-Level Description
We provide an overview of the [Haitner et al., 2011] compiler (which is in turn reminiscent of the
constructions in [Cre´peau et al., 1995]). Our presentation is slightly different from, and simpler
than, that in the original works, and is closer in spirit to the [Goldreich et al., 1988] compiler.
Our presentation is easier to adapt to the UC setting and the adaptive setting (and also OT with
strings instead of bits) since we do not need to rely on the intermediate notion and construction of
a defensible OT protocol.7 We focus on the main transformation Comp (shown in Fig 5.3), which
“boosts” the security guarantee of an OT protocol  from security against semi-honest receivers to
security against malicious receivers while preserving the security guarantee for corrupted senders.
Phase I: Random tape generation. The sender and the receiver engage in a coin-tossing (in the
well) protocol to determine a collection of 2n random strings for the receiver.
Phase II: Basic execution. The sender and the receiver engage in 2n parallel executions of  with
random inputs: the sender will choose its own inputs randomly and independently for each of
the 2n executions, whereas the inputs and randomness for the receiver are determined by the
preceding coin-tossing protocol (one random string for each execution of ).
Phase III: Cut-and-choose. The sender and the receiver engage in a coin-tossing protocol to pick
a random subset Q of n executions, and the receiver proves that it acted accordingly to 
for the n executions in Q by revealing the inputs and randomness used for those executions.
The sender verifies that the inputs and randomness are indeed consistent with both the n
executions of  and the coin-tossing protocol, and if so, we are guaranteed that the receiver
must have behaved honestly in at least one of the n executions of  not in Q (except with
negligible probability). Otherwise, the sender detects the malicious behavior of the receiver
and aborts the protocol. Note that in this case the sender’s security is preserved since, although
7Specifically, the previous compiler proceeds in two phases. The first [Haitner, 2008] transforms any semi-honest OT
protocol into defensible OT protocols. A defensible OT protocol provides an intermediate level of security interpolating
semi-honest and malicious OT. The second [Ishai et al., 2006] transforms any defensible OT protocol into a malicious
one.
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the receiver may have learned all of the sender’s random inputs in Phase II by behaving
maliciously in all 2n OT executions, this information reveals nothing about the sender’s true
inputs.
Phase IV: Combiner. We may then apply a combiner that (essentially) yields a single secure OT
protocol, starting a collection of n OT protocols all of which guarantee security against a
malicious sender, but only one of which guarantee security against a malicious receiver.
To obtain a full-fledged string-OT protocol secure against both a malicious sender and a malicious
receiver starting from a semi-honest bit-OT protocol, we proceed as in [Ishai et al., 2006], with the
addition of Step 3 to directly obtain a string-OT protocol and with references to semi-honest instead
of defensible adversaries:
1. Use Comp to obtain a bit-OT protocol secure against a semi-honest sender and a malicious
receiver.
2. Use OT reversal [Wolf and Wullschleger, 2006] (shown in Fig 5.4) to obtain a bit-OT protocol
secure against a malicious sender and a semi-honest receiver.
3. Repeat in parallel to obtain a string-OT protocol secure against a malicious sender and a
semi-honest receiver.
4. Use Comp again to obtain a string-OT protocol secure against malicious sender and receiver.
In this work, we will view the above construction in the FCOM-hybrid model, where the FCOM
functionality is used to implement the coin-tossing protocol in Phases I and III [Blum, 1981;
Canetti and Rabin, 2003].
5.2.2 Achieving Security against Adaptive Adversaries
The main technical challenge in coping with adaptive adversaries in Comp() lies in simulating
the sender messages in Phase II of Comp() for the case of a malicious receiver and honest sender.
One possible approach is to simply run the honest sender’s code in Phase II with random inputs.
However, this approach does not allow us to handle the case that the adversary chooses to corrupt
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INITIALIZATION.
Sender input: (sender; sid; s0; s1) where s0; s1 2 f0; 1g`.
Receiver input: (receiver; sid; r) where r 2 f0; 1g.
PHASE I: RANDOM TAPE GENERATION.
1. R chooses 2n random strings (rR1 ; 
R
1 ); : : : ; (r
R
2n; 
R
2n) and sends (commit; sidi; r
R
i ; 
R
i ) to
FCOM, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2n.
2. Upon receiving (receipt; sid1); : : : ; (receipt; sid2n) from FCOM, S sends 2n random strings
(rS1; 
S
1 ); : : : ; (r
S
2n; 
S
2n).
3. R sets ri = rRi  rSi and i = Ri   Si , for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2n.
PHASE II: BASIC EXECUTION.
1. S chooses 2n pairs of random inputs (s01; s
1
1); : : : ; (s
0
2n; s
1
2n).
2. S and R engages in 2n parallel executions of the protocol . In the ith execution, S inputs
(s0i ; s
1
i ) and R inputs ri with randomness i and obtains output s
ri
i .
PHASE III: CUT-AND-CHOOSE.
1. S chooses a random q = (q1; : : : ; qn) 2 f0; 1gn. The string q is used to define a set of indices
Q  f1; 2; : : : ; 2ng of size n in the following way: Q = f2i  qigni=1.
2. For every i 2 Q, R sends (reveal; sidi) to FCOM and upon receiving (reveal; sidi; rRi ; Ri ) from
FCOM, S computes (ri; i).
3. S checks that for all i 2 Q, (ri; i) is consistent with R’s messages in the i’th execution of .
If not, S aborts and halts.
PHASE IV: COMBINER.
1. For every j =2 Q, R computes j = r  rj and sends fjgj =2Q to S.
2. S computes 0 = s0  (
L
j =2Q s
j
j ) and 1 = s1  (
L
j =2Q s
1 j
j ) and sends (0; 1).
3. R computes and outputs sr = r  (
L
j =2Q s
rj
j ).
Figure 5.3: THE ADAPTIVE COMPILER Comp()
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the sender at the end of the protocol: Once the sender’s inputs are revealed, we cannot go back and
change the random inputs used in Phase II to be consistent with these inputs. Another approach
is to use the simulator for  to simulate sender messages in Phase II for the case of honest sender
and corrupt receiver. The problem with this approach is that the receiver may behave maliciously
in some of the executions in Phase II and  is only guaranteed to be simulatable when the receiver
behaves semi-honestly. What we actually do is combine the above two approaches and simulate
honest sender messages in Phase II against a malicious receiver as follows:
1. For each i, extract the receiver’s input and randomness for the i’th execution of  from the
commitment in Phase I.
2. Upon receiving a message from the receiver in the i’th execution of , check if all of the
receiver’s messages so far are consistent with its input and randomness. If so, generate the
sender’s response by using the simulator for . Otherwise, corrupt the sender in the i’th
execution of to obtain its input and random tape and complete the simulation of the sender’s
messages using the honest sender strategy.
We note that, unlike the compiler of [Haitner et al., 2011], our compiler does not require a coin-
tossing protocol to determine the set opened in the cut-and-choose in Phase III. Instead, this set is
chosen by the sender alone.
5.2.3 Achieving Security against Static Adversaries
Our analysis also extends to the UC static case. More specifically, we prove the following analogue
of Theorem 5.1.1:
Theorem 5.2.1 There exists a black-box construction of a protocol that UC realizes string-OT
against a static, malicious adversary in the FCOM-hybrid, starting from any bit-OT protocol secure
against a static, semi-honest adversary in the stand-alone model. Moreover, the construction
achieves a constant multiplicative blow-up in the number of rounds.
We note that, unlike in the adaptive case, our compiler for static adversaries requires the parties to
run a coin-tossing protocol in Phase III. The reason that coin-tossing is required in the static case but
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not the adaptive case seems closely related to the selective decommitment problem which occurs
in the static case but not the adaptive case (see, [Dwork et al., 2003]). Nevertheless, our result and
analysis for static adversaries offers several improvements over that in [Haitner et al., 2011]:
 The simulator in [Ishai et al., 2006] uses rewinding and runs in expected polynomial time,
even in the FCOM-hybrid model.
 Our result immediately yields string-OT protocols and in a constant number of rounds.
 We eliminate several complications of the analysis in both [Ishai et al., 2006] and [Haitner,
2008], most notably verifying that the OT reversal protocol in [Wolf and Wullschleger, 2006]
works for defensible adversaries [Ishai et al., 2006, Claim 5.2]. The overall analysis is
simpler, more modular, and more intuitive.
Organization.
We present our analysis of Comp and OT reversal for adaptive adversaries in the UC model in
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. We deal with the case of static adversaries in Section 5.5.
5.3 Achieving security against a malicious receiver
In this section, we show that Comp boosts the security guarantee from security against semi-honest
receivers to security against malicious receivers.
Proposition 5.3.1 Suppose  is a protocol that UC realizes FOT against a semi-honest, adaptive
adversary, and let Comp() be the protocol obtained by applying the compiler in Fig 5.3 to .
Then, Comp() UC realizes FOT against an adaptive adversary with a semi-honest sender and a
malicious receiver. Moreover, if  is in addition secure against a malicious, adaptive sender, then
Comp() UC realizes FOT against an adaptive adversary with malicious sender and receiver.
A hybrid execution.
To facilitate the analysis, we introduce an intermediate setting (inspired by [Ishai et al., 2007])
in which the protocol Comp() is executed, where there is again a sender S and a receiver R
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and in addition 2n pairs of “virtual” parties (S1;R1); : : : ; (S2n;R2n). The i’th execution of  in
Comp() will be executed by Si and Ri with inputs from S and R respectively. We will require
that R1; : : : ;R2n are always semi-honest; i.e. they use a truly random tape for . Moreover, the
environment is not aware of the “virtual parties”.
PHASE I/II: BASIC EXECUTION.8 S chooses 2n pairs of random inputs (s01; s
1
1); : : : ; (s
0
2n; s
1
2n)
and R chooses 2n random inputs r1; : : : ; r2n. For each i = 1; : : : ; 2n, S activates Si with
(sender; sidi; s0i ; s
1
i ) and R activates Ri with (receiver; sidi; ri). In HYBRID;A;Z , the parties
Si and Ri execute  in parallel. In HYBRIDFOT;A;Z , the parties Si and Ri call the ideal
functionality FOT.
PHASE III: CUT-AND-CHOOSE. S chooses a random q 2 f0; 1gn which identifies Q 
f1; 2; : : : ; 2ng as in Comp() and sends q to R. S checks that for all i 2 Q, Si is not
corrupted. Otherwise, abort.
PHASE IV: COMBINER. Proceed as in Phase IV of Comp().
We say that an adversary A in the hybrid execution is well-formed if it satisfies the following
properties:
 When A corrupts S, it also corrupts each of S1; : : : ;S2n. Moreover, if S is semi-honest, then
S1; : : : ;S2n are semi-honest.
 When A corrupts R, it also corrupts each of R1; : : : ;R2n. Moreover, R1; : : : ;R2n are always
semi-honest, even if R is malicious.
 If R is corrupted, then A may corrupt any of S1; : : : ;S2n with semi-honest behavior, without
corrupting S.
 Upon receiving the set Q in Phase III from S, A may corrupt all of Rj ; j 2 Q with semi-
honest behavior, even if neither R nor S is corrupted. However, if R is not corrupted, then
Rj ; j =2 Q are also not corrupted.
8The choice of notation is so that Phase III always corresponds to cut-and-choose and Phase IV corresponds to
combiner in both Comp() and in the hybrid executions.
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We will also stipulate that the communication channels between S and each of S1; : : : ;S2n are
private and authenticated. The same holds for the communication channels between R and each of
R1; : : : ;R2n. In addition, S learns whether each of S1; : : : ;S2n is corrupted.
Lemma 5.3.2 For every adversaryA that interacts with Comp() in the FCOM-hybrid model, there
exists a well-formed adversary A0 that interacts in the hybrid execution running , such that for
every environment Z ,
EXEC
FCOM
Comp();A;Z  HYBRID;A0;Z
The statement of the lemma holds for protocols  that are secure against semi-honest, adaptive
adversaries without erasures and well-formed adaptive adversaries A0 and A00. In the first step,
we show how to enforce semi-honest behavior of R1; : : : ;R2n in HYBRID;A0;Z . The high-level
strategy is as follows: if a corrupted receiver in Comp() deviates from semi-honest behavior in the
i’th execution of  in Phase II, we corrupt Si in HYBRID;A0;Z to obtain its input and randomness,
and continue the simulation by running the honest sender strategy. Proof: As usual, A0 works by
invoking a copy of A and running a simulated interaction of A with Z and the parties S and R. We
will refer to the communication of A0 with Z and Comp() as external communication, and that
with the simulated A as internal communication. More precisely, A0 works as follows:
Simulating the communication with Z: Every input value that A0 receives from Z externally is
written into the adversary A’s input tape (as if coming from A’s environment). Every output
value written by A on its output tape is copied to A0’s own output tape (to be read by the
external Z).
Simulating the case when neither party is corrupted:
PHASE I. A0 internally passesA the message (receipt; sid1); (receipt; sid2); : : : ; (receipt; sid2n)
as if sent from FCOM to S. Then, A0 chooses 2n random strings (rS1 ;  S1 ); : : : ; (rS2n;  S2n),
and simulates S sending R those 2n strings.
PHASE II. For each round in the protocol , if it is the receiver’s turn, then for each i =
1; : : : ; 2n,A0 obtains i from Ri for the corresponding round. Next,A0 internally passes
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A the message (1; : : : ; 2n), as if sent from R to S. The sender’s turn is handled
analogously.
PHASE III. When S externally sends q which determines Q, then for each i 2 Q: corrupt Ri
to obtain (ri; i) and compute rRi = rirSi and Ri = i Si . Send (reveal; sidi; rRi ; Ri )
to A as if coming from FCOM.
PHASE IV. Just forward all the messages between S and R.
Simulating the case when only the sender is corrupted: This is essentially the same as when neither
party is corrupted, except the values (rS1 ; 
S
1 ); : : : ; (r
S
2n; 
S
2n) in Phase I, sender messages in
Phase II, and the value q in Phase III are chosen by A.
Simulating the case when only the receiver is corrupted:
PHASE I. A0 externally corrupts (R1; : : : ;R2n) and chooses (r1; : : : ; r2n) and (1; : : : ; 2n)
at random. Next,A0 obtains fromA the messages (commit; sidi; rRi ; Ri ) as sent by R to
FCOM. Then, A0 sets rSi = ri  rRi and  Si = i  Ri for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2n and internally
passes (rS1 ; 
S
1 ); : : : ; (r
S
2n; 
S
2n) to A as if sent by S to R.
PHASE II. We need to simulate the external messages sent by S in Comp() (with the
“help” of S1; : : : ;S2n). If R behaves consistently in the ith execution of , we will
just obtain the corresponding message from Si; otherwise, we will corrupt Si so that we
may compute those messages.
First, we handle receiver messages in Comp(). Whenever A sends a message
(1; : : : ; 2n) from R where i is the message in the ith parallel execution of , do
the following for each i = 1; : : : ; 2n:
 If Ri has not aborted and i is consistent with (ri; i), deliver the corresponding
message from Ri to Si.
 If Ri has not aborted and i is not consistent with (ri; i), A0 tells Ri to abort. In
addition, A0 corrupts Si to obtain its input (s0i ; s1i ) and its randomness.
 If Ri has aborted, then record i and do nothing.
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Next, we handle sender messages in Comp(). Whenever A expects a message
(1; : : : ; 2n) from S, where i is the message in the ith parallel execution of , do
the following for each i = 1; : : : ; 2n:
 If Si is corrupted, thenA0 computes i according to Si’s input and randomness and
the previous messages from Ri.
 If Si is not corrupted, then set i to be the corresponding message sent from Si to
Ri.
A0 then sends (1; : : : ; 2n) to A as if sent by S to R.
PHASE III. Deliver q sent externally by S to R. Check that for all i 2 Q, Si is not corrupted.
Otherwise, abort.
PHASE IV. Just forward all the messages between S and R.
Dealing with corruption of parties: When the simulated A internally corrupts R, A0 externally
corrupts R and thus R1; : : : ;R2n, and learns the values r1; : : : ; r2n and 1; : : : ; 2n (in addition
to the input r). A0 then sets rRi = rirSi and Ri = i Si for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2n and internally
passes (rR1 ; 
R
1 ); : : : ; (r
R
2n; 
R
2n) to A as the randomness for R in Comp(). Similarly, when
the simulatedA internally corrupts S,A0 externally corrupts S and thus S1; : : : ; S2n and learns
the values (s01; s
1
1); : : : ; (s
0
2n; s
1
2n) along with the randomness used by S1; : : : ;S2n in the 2n
executions of . A0 then internally passes all of these values to A as the randomness for S in
Comp(). In addition, for all i 2 Q,A0 passes the value (rRi ; Ri ) toA as the value sent from
FCOM to S in Phase III.
It is straight-forward to verify that in Phase III, checking Si is not corrupted in HYBRID;A0;Z
is identical to R behaving consistently in the ith execution of  in Comp(). Thus, the abort
condition at the end of Phase III are identical. We may therefore conclude that the ensembles EXEC
and HYBRID are identical.
Lemma 5.3.3 For every well-formed adversary A0 that interacts in the hybrid execution running
, there exists a well-formed adversaryA00 that interacts in the hybrid execution running FOT, such
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that for every environment Z ,
HYBRID;A0;Z
c HYBRIDFOT;A00;Z
The statement of the lemma is intended for protocols that are secure against semi-honest, adaptive
adversaries without erasures and well-formed adaptive adversaries A0 and A00. However, we note
that the lemma also holds for protocols  that are secure against semi-honest, adaptive adversaries
with erasures and well-formed adaptive adversaries A0 and A00 with erasures as well as protocols
 that are secure against semi-honest, static adversaries and well-formed static adversaries A0 and
A00.
Proof: The idea is that we may interpret HYBRID;A0;Z as an execution involving 4n + 2 parties
S;R;S1; : : : ;S2n;R1; : : : ;R2n jointly running some protocol that uses  as a sub-routine, and
HYBRIDFOT;A00;Z as an execution involving the same 4n+2 parties running the same protocol except
with an ideal FOT functionality instead of . The claim then follows from the UC composition
[Canetti, 2001].
Lemma 5.3.4 For every well-formed adversary A00 that interacts in the hybrid execution running
FOT, there exists an ideal-process adversary S, such that for every environment Z ,
HYBRIDFOT;A00;Z s IDEALFOT;S;Z
The statement of the lemma is intended for adaptive adversaries A00 and S. However, we note that
the lemma also holds for adaptive adversaries A00 and S with erasures as well as static adversaries
A00 and S.
Proof: Again, we first specify S depending on the corruption pattern:
Simulating the communication with Z: Every input value that S receives from Z externally is
written into the adversary A00’s input tape (as if coming from A00’s environment). Every
output value written by A00 on its output tape is copied to S’s own output tape (to be read by
the external Z).
Simulating the case when neither party is corrupted:
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PHASE I/II. Internally pass (receiver; sid1), : : :, (receiver; sid2n) and (output; sid1), : : :,
(output; sid2n) to A00 as if FOT did.
PHASE III. Internally pass a random q 2 f0; 1gn to A00 as if S sent it to R. For each i 2 Q,
when A00 corrupts Ri, pick a random ri 2 f0; 1g and a random srii 2 f0; 1g`.
PHASE IV. Wait until (receiver; sid) comes externally from FOT. Send random fjgj =2Q as
if sent from R. Wait until (output; sid) comes externally from FOT. Internally pass
random (0; 1) to A00 as if S sent the pair to R.
Simulating the case when only the sender is corrupted:
PHASE I/II. Internally pass (receiver; sid1), : : :, (receiver; sid2n) to A00 as if FOT did. When
A00 as Si sends (sender; sidi; s0i ; s1i ) to FOT, S records (s0i ; s1i ) and internally passes
(output; sid1), : : :, (output; sid2n) to A00 as if FOT did.
PHASE III. Proceed as in the case neither party is corrupted, except q is chosen by A00.
PHASE IV. Wait until (receiver; sid) comes externally from FOT. Internally pass random
fjgj =2Q to A00 as if R did. When A00 as S sends (0; 1), compute s0 = 0 
(
L
j =2Q s
j
j ) and s1 = 1  (
L
j =2Q s
1 j
j ). Externally send (sender; s0; s1) to FOT.
Simulating the case when only the receiver is corrupted:
PHASE I/II. S picks 2n pairs of random inputs (s01; s11); : : : ; (s02n; s12n). If A00 as Ri sends
(receiver, sidi; ri) to FOT, S records ri and internally passes (receiver; sidi) to A00 as if
FOT did. Then, S internally passes (output; sidi; srii ) to A00 as if FOT sent the message
to Ri. If A00 corrupts Si, then S presents (s0i ; s1i ) as Si’s input to A00.
PHASE III. Pick a random q 2 f0; 1gn and internally pass q to A00 as if S did. Compute
Q  f1; 2; : : : ; 2ng as in Comp(). Check that for all i 2 Q, Si is not corrupted.
Otherwise, S simulates an abort from S.
PHASE IV. Compute j =2 Q where Sj is not corrupted; output failure if such a j does
not exist. When A00 sends fjgj =2Q as R, compute r = j  rj and externally send
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(receiver; sid; r) to FOT. Upon receiving (output; sid; sr) externally from FOT, compute
(0; 1) so that r is consistent with sr as follows:
 If r = 0, then 0 = s0  (
L
j =2Q s
j
j ) and 1 is a random string in f0; 1g`.
 If r = 1, then 0 is a random string in f0; 1g` and 1 = s1  (
L
j =2Q s
1 j
j ).
S then sends (0; 1) to A00 as if sent by S to R.
Dealing with corruptions: Corruptions of R1; : : : ;R2n;S1; : : : ;S2n may be handled as above. For
corruptions of R and S, we will consider two cases depending on the corruption schedule. In
the first case, at least one of the parties is corrupted before the message (0; 1) is sent.
 Once S is corrupted, S learns the actual input (s0; s1). If S is corrupted before the
messages (0; 1) are computed, then S may simply present (s01; s11); : : : ; (s02n; s12n) (as
chosen in Phase I) as the randomness of S. Otherwise, S modifies s1 rjj (if necessary)
so that both relations 0 = s0(
L
j =2Q s
j
j ) and 1 = s1(
L
j =2Q s
1 j
j ) are satisfied.
 Once R is corrupted, S learns the actual input r. If R is corrupted before the messages
fjgj =2Q are computed, then S may simply present (r1; : : : ; r2n) (as chosen in Phase
I) as the randomness of R. Otherwise, S modifies frjgj =2Q so that rj = r  j . In
addition, S presents srii as the output of Ri; i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2n.
In the other case, neither party is corrupted when the message (0; 1) is sent.
 Once S is corrupted, we will modify both s0j and s1j so that (0; 1) is consistent with
(s0; s1).
 Once R is corrupted, we will first modify frjgj =2Q as in the previous case and then
modify s
rj
j so that r is consistent with sr.
We claim that if S does not output failure, then the ensembles HYBRIDFOT;A00;Z and IDEALFOT;S;Z
are identical. This is clear up to the end of Phase III. For Phase IV, observe that if S and Sj are not
corrupted, then from the view of A00 and Z in HYBRIDFOT;A00;Z , the string s
1 rj
j is truly random.
As such, 1 r is also truly random. Similarly, if R is not corrupted, then from the view of A00 and
Z , the n values frjgj =2Q are truly random and thus fjgj =2Q are also truly random. Furthermore, if
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neither S nor R is corrupted just before the message (0; 1) is sent, then from the view of A00 and
Z , both s0j and s1j are truly random, and thus both 0 and 1 are truly random.
It remains to show that S outputs failurewith negligible probability. Observe that S only outputs
failure if at the start of Phase IV, all of the following conditions hold:
 Neither party has aborted. In addition, the sender is honest at the start of Phase IV, so the
challenge q is chosen at random.
 Amongst the n pairs of parties (S1;S2); : : : ; (S2n 1;S2n), exactly one party in each pair is
corrupted. Otherwise, if there is a pair where both parties are corrupted, then S will abort at
the end of Phase III; and if there is a pair where neither party is corrupted, then there is an
uncorrupted Sj .
 The set Q corresponding to the challenge q is exactly the set of n uncorrupted parties (one in
each pair).
Clearly, the last condition only holds with probability 2 n over a random choice of q.
5.4 Malicious sender and semi-honest receiver
In this section, we reverse the OT protocol from the previous section to obtain one that is secure
for a malicious sender and a semi-honest receiver. The construction (shown in Fig 5.4) is the same
as that in [Wolf and Wullschleger, 2006], the novelty lies in the analysis which establishes security
against an adaptive adversary. We note that the analysis though tedious, is fairly straight-forward.
Proposition 5.4.1 For every adaptive adversary A that interacts with the protocol  in the FOT-
hybrid model, there exists an adaptive adversary S that interacts with FOT, such that for every
environment Z ,
EXEC
FOT
 ;A;Z  IDEALFOT;S;Z :
Moreover, the corruption pattern in S is the reverse of that in A.
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INITIALIZATION.
Sender input: (sender; sid; s0; s1) where s0; s1 2 f0; 1g and sid = (S;R; sid0).
Receiver input: (receiver; sid; r) where r 2 f0; 1g.
PHASE I: CALL FOT.
1. S sends (receiver; sid1; s0  s1) to
2. Upon receiving (receiver; sid1) from FOT, R chooses a bit  2R f0; 1g and sends
(sender; sid1; ;  r) to FOT.
PHASE II: REVERSE.
1. Upon receiving (output; sid1; a) from FOT, S computes  = s0  a and sends  to R.
2. Upon receiving , R computes and outputs  .
Figure 5.4: THE OT-REVERSAL PROTOCOL  
The statement of the lemma is intended for protocols  that are secure against semi-honest, adaptive
adversaries without erasures and adaptive adversaries A and S. However, we note that the lemma
also holds for protocols  that are secure against semi-honest, adaptive adversaries with erasures
and semi-honest, adaptive adversaries A and S with erasures as well as protocols  that are secure
against semi-honest, static adversaries and static adversaries A and S.
Proof: As usual, S works by invoking a copy of A and running a simulated interaction of A with
Z and the parties S and R in the FOT-hybrid model. We will refer to the communication of S with
Z and  as external communication, and that with the simulated A as internal communication. In
addition, we will refer to the FOT functionality in the real execution as the internal FOT, and that in
the ideal execution as the external FOT. S works as follows:
Simulating the communication with Z: Every input value that S externally receives from Z is
written into the adversary A’s input tape (as if coming from A’s environment). Every output
value written by A on its output tape is copied to S’s own output tape (to be read by the
external Z).
Simulating the case when neither party is corrupted: Internally pass (receiver; sid1) to A as
if FOT did. Wait until (receiver; sid) comes externally from FOT, and then internally pass
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(output; sid1) to A as if FOT did. Wait until (output; sid) comes externally from FOT, and
then choose  2 f0; 1g at random and internally pass  to A as if S sent it to R.
Simulating the case when only the sender is corrupted: When A as S sends (receiver; sid1; d)
to FOT, S first waits until (receiver; sid) comes externally from FOT, and then S chooses
a 2 f0; 1g at random and internally passes (output; sid1; a) to A as if FOT did.
When A as S sends , S externally sends (sender; sid; a ; a  d) to FOT.
Simulating the case when only the receiver is corrupted: Internally pass (receiver; sid1) to A as
if FOT did. When A as R sends (sender; sid1; a0; a1) to FOT, S sets  = a0, r = a0  a1
and externally sends (receiver; sid; r) to FOT. S also internally passes (output; sid1) to A as
if FOT did.
Upon receiving (output; sid; sr) externally from FOT, S internally passes  = sr   to A as
if S sent it.
Dealing with corruptions: When R is corrupted, S needs to present A with a consistent random
tape comprising of a single bit . When S is corrupted, S needs to present A with the output
bit a which S receives from the internal FOT. We consider four cases depending on the
corruption schedule:
 Case 1: R is corrupted before it sends its input to the internal FOT. In this case, S
proceeds as in the case when only the receiver is corrupted to compute  and r. If and
when S is corrupted, S computes a =   rd where d is S’s input to the internal FOT
(set to s0  s1 if S is honest when it submits its input to the internal FOT).
 Case 2: Neither party is corrupted when  is sent. In this case, S picks a random
 2 f0; 1g. Then, when R is corrupted, S learns both its input r and its output sr, and
computes  =   sr. When S is corrupted, S learns its input s0; s1 and computes
a =  s0.
If neither Case 1 nor Case 2 holds, then the adversary A corrupts either R or S (or both) and
learns at least one of  and a before seeing .
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 Case 3: A learns a first. This means A corrupts S first and corrupts R (if at all) after
S receives a from the internal FOT. Then, S proceeds as in the case where only the
sender is corrupted and picks a random a 2 f0; 1g. When R is corrupted, S learns r and
computes  = a rd (where d is again S’s input to the internal FOT).
 Case 4: A learns  first. This means either A corrupts R first, or A corrupts R before S
receives a from the internal FOT.9 In this case, S picks  2 f0; 1g at random when R is
corrupted, and subsequently (if and when A corrupts S) computes a =  rd.
Finally, we need to check that EXECFOT ;A;Z  IDEALFOT;S;Z , which is similar to that in [Wolf and
Wullschleger, 2006] which addresses static corruptions.
5.5 Security against Static Adversaries
In this section we prove Theorem 5.2.1 by modifying our analysis for the case where we start with a
protocol  secure against semi-honest, static adversaries and end with a protocol Comp() secure
against malicious, static adversaries. In order for the analysis to go through, we must ensure that
when dealing with a static adversary, the corruption pattern in the underlying components of FCOM
and is always static. We note that it is, in fact, the case that the corruption pattern forFCOM and the
real adversaries is always static. However, it turns out that even when dealing with a static adversary,
the corruption pattern for “virtual” parties executing  may be adaptive. Thus, the analysis for the
static case does not immediately follow from the adaptive case. Our key insight for proving the
static case, inspired by [Ishai et al., 2008], is that in order to simulate the adaptive corruption of
“virtual parties,” it suffices for  to be secure against adaptive adversaries with erasures. More
specifically, we prove the following theorem, for the case of adaptive adversaries with erasures:
Theorem 5.5.1 There exists a black-box construction of a protocol that UC realizes OT against a
malicious, adaptive adversary with erasures in the FCOM-hybrid model, starting from any protocol
that UC realizes OT against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary with erasures. Moreover, the
construction achieves a constant multiplicative blow-up in the number of rounds.
9In particular, it could be thatA corrupts S at the start of the protocol (learning nothing at this point), and then corrupts
R immediately after it sends its input to the internal FOT .
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PHASE III: CUT-AND-CHOOSE.
1. R chooses a random qR 2 f0; 1gn and sends (commit; sid2n+1; qR) to FCOM.
2. Upon receiving (receipt; sid2n+1) from FCOM, S sends a random qS 2 f0; 1gn.
3. R sets q = qRqS. The string q = (q1; : : : ; qn) 2 f0; 1gn is used to define a set of indicesQ 
f1; 2; : : : ; 2ng of size n in the following way: Q = f2i  qigni=1. R sends (reveal; sid2n+1) to
FCOM so that S may also compute Q.
4. For every i 2 Q, R sends (reveal; sidi) to FCOM and upon receiving (reveal; sidi; rRi ; Ri ) from
FCOM, S computes (ri; i).
5. S checks that for all i 2 Q, (ri; i) is consistent with R’s messages in the i’th execution of .
If not, S aborts and halts.
Figure 5.5: PHASE III OF THE ADAPTIVE WITH ERASURES COMPILER Comp()
Next, recall the following theorem from [Lindell, 2009]:
Lemma 5.5.2 ([Lindell, 2009]) There exists a black-box construction of a t+O(1)-round protocol
that UC realizes OT against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary with erasures, starting from any
t-round protocol that UC realizes OT against a semi-honest, static adversary.
By combining the compiler of [Lindell, 2009] with our compiler for adaptively secure protocols
with erasures in Theorem 5.5.1, we obtain a compiler for statically secure protocols which concludes
the proof of Theorem 5.2.1.
Towards proving Theorem 5.5.1, we modify our original compiler Comp() for the setting of
adaptive corruptions with erasures. The modified compiler differs from the adaptive compiler only
in Phase III, where the string q (which determines the set Q) is chosen via a coin-tossing protocol
in the static compiler and is chosen by S alone in the adaptive compiler (see Figure 5.5). As we
discuss in more detail below, this modification is necessary in order to simulate the case of a corrupt
sender and honest receiver without adaptively corrupting the virtual parties Ri in Phase III.
To prove Theorem 5.5.1 it is sufficient to reprove the analogues of Lemmas 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4
and Proposition 5.4.1 for the case where we begin and end with protocols secure against adaptive
adversaries with erasures. Now, note that the proofs of Lemmas 5.3.3, 5.3.4 and Proposition 5.4.1
proceed identically when beginning with an oblivious transfer protocol  secure against semi-
honest, adaptive adversaries with erasures and concluding with a protocol Comp() secure under
against malcious, adaptive adversaries with erasures.
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In contrast, in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2, we do rely on the fact that  is secure even under
adaptive corruptions without erasures. Thus, we reprove Lemma 5.3.2 below for the case of adaptive
corruptions with erasures.
Lemma 5.5.3 Let  be an OT-protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries and adaptive
corruptions with erasures. For every adversary A that interacts with Comp() in the FCOM-hybrid
model, there exists a well-formed adversary A0 that interacts in the hybrid execution running ,
such that for every environment Z ,
EXEC
FCOM
Comp();A;Z  HYBRID;A0;Z
Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2, A0 works by invoking a copy ofA and running a simulated
interaction of A with Z and the parties S and R. We will refer to the communication of A0 with Z
and Comp() as external communication, and that with the simulatedA as internal communication.
More precisely, A0 works as follows:
Simulating the communication with Z: This is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
Simulating the case when neither party is corrupted: This is handled as in the proof of
Lemma 5.3.2 exceptA0 chooses the setQ and corrupts all parties Ri for i 2 Q before Phase II
begins. During Phase II, A0 computes the next messages on behalf of Ri for i 2 Q according
to the code of the honest receiver and forwards to A.
Simulating the case when only the sender is corrupted: Unlike in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2, A0
will pick q in advance (before Phase II begins) and will later fix the outcome of the coin-toss
in Phase III to q. In Phase II, for sessions i in Q, A0 computes the next messages according
to the code of the honest receiver and forwards to A. For sessions i not in Q, A0 forwards the
messages of the virtual party Ri to A.
PHASE I. This is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
PHASE II. A0 chooses q 2 f0; 1gn (and the corresponding set Q) uniformly at random. For
each i 2 Q, A0 corrupts Ri before the execution of  commences. Next, for each round
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in the protocol , whenever A expects a message (1; : : : ; 2n) from R, then for each
i = 1; : : : ; 2n, if i =2 Q, A0 obtains i from Ri for the corresponding round. Otherwise,
A0 computes i according to Ri’s input and randomness and the previous messages from
Si. Finally, A0 internally passes A the message (1; : : : ; 2n), as if sent from R to S.
The sender’s turn is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
PHASE III. A0 internally passes A the message (receipt; sid2n+1) as if sent from FCOM to
S. Then, A chooses qS 2 f0; 1gn and A0 simulates S sending R this string. Next,
A0 internally passes A the message (reveal; sid2n+1; qR) where qR is chosen such that
qR = q  qS. For each i 2 Q, A0 computes rRi = ri  rSi and Ri = i   Si . A0 sends
(reveal; sidi; rRi ; 
R
i ) to A as if coming from FCOM.
PHASE IV. This is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
Simulating the case when only the receiver is corrupted: We note that it is in simulating this case
where adaptive corruptions of virtual parties become necessary. We will need to adaptively
corrupt a virtual party Si during Phase II in the case that virtual party Ri begins to deviate
from semi-honest behavior. In the proof of Lemma 5.3.2, A0 corrupts Si, learns its input
and randomness, and continues playing the role of sender honestly with party Ri using the
revealed input and randomness. When dealing with adaptive corruptions with erasures, A0
may not learn Si’s entire random tape upon corruption. However, we note that in this case
adaptive corruptions with erasures are sufficient: In the adaptive corruptions with erasures
model, upon corruption of Si, the adversary learns the internal state, which includes the
sender’s input, and by correctness, sufficient information to complete the execution of the
protocol.
PHASE I. This is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
PHASE II. This simulation proceeds identically to the proof of Lemma 5.3.2 except for the
following case: Whenever A sends a message (1; : : : ; 2n) from R where i is the
message in the ith parallel execution of , if Ri has not aborted and i is not consistent
with (ri; i), A0 tells Ri to abort. In addition, A0 corrupts Si. Since  is only adaptively
secure with erasures, we do not obtain its input (s0i ; s
1
i ) and its entire randomness upon
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corruption, but only its input (s0i ; s
1
i ) and a partial view. However, we note that this
partial view is sufficient for the simulation to proceed as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
PHASE III. This is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
PHASE IV. This is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
Dealing with corruption of parties: This is handled as in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2 except we
assume honest parties may erase data. Thus, upon corruption of parties the adversary learns
the internal state, which includes the party’s input, and by correctness, sufficient information
to continue the execution of the protocol.
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Conclusions
In this thesis we resolve several questions on black-box complexity and adaptive, universal
composibility of cryptogarphic tasks. Below we describe future research directions and open
problems relating to our work.
Black-Box Complexity: In Chapter 2 we show a black-box construction of a non-malleable
encryption scheme from any semantically-secure encryption scheme. A remaining open question
is to determine the black-box complexity of encryption schemes that guarantee a stronger form of
security, security under adaptive chosen-ciphertext (CCA2) attacks. For instance, the relationship
between CCA2-secure encryption and semantically-secure encryption is still unresolved. [Gertner
et al., 2007] consider a restricted type of black-box reduction, called a “shielding reduction” and
prove that no shielding reduction from CCA2-secure encryption to semantically-secure encryption
exists. However, the question of whether an unrestricted black-box (or even non-black-box)
reduction from CCA2-secure encryption to semantically-secure encryption exists remains open.
Another related question is to determine the relationship between CCA2-secure encryption and
enhanced trapdoor permutations (eTDP). In their seminal work, [Dolev et al., 2000] presented
a non-black-box construction of CCA2-secure encryption from eTDP, but over a decade later no
black-box construction is known. A major open problem is to either show a black-box reduction of
CCA2-secure encryption to eTDP or prove that such a reduction does not exist.
In Chapter 3 we prove that there is no black-box reduction from optimally-fair coin-tossing
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with “few” rounds to one-way function (OWF). Our work leaves open the question of whether there
exists a black-box reduction of optimally-fair coin-tossing with polynomial number of rounds to
one-way function (OWF). Resolving this question either positively or negatively is a compelling
open problem.
A high-level open problem relating to black-box complexity is determining the relative strength
of fully black-box reductions (that access both the underlying primitive and the adversary only in an
input-output manner) versus reductions that access the adversary in a black-box manner, but access
the underlying primitive in a non-black-box manner. [Brakerski et al., 2011] and [Pass et al., 2011]
both raised similar questions in their recent works and give partial answers by showing that in some
limited cases, access to the code of the underlying primitive does not increase the power of the
reduction.
Universal Composability and Adaptive Security: Although our constructions of UC and
adaptively-secure MPC in Chapters 4 and 5 are relatively efficient, they are still not efficient enough
to be used in practice. Constructing highly efficient protocols for UC oblivious transfer (OT) secure
against malicious, adaptive adversaries, based on either general assumptions or on specific hardness
assumptions, is an important open problem.
The protocol presented in Chapter 5 relies on black-box access to an Ideal Commitment
functionality FCOM. Unlike in the standard model where commitments are relatively simple
constructs, the adaptive UC Ideal Commitment functionality is a “complete” functionality (in
the sense of [Maji et al., 2010]). Thus, in order to realize the adaptive UC Ideal Commitment
functionality, we require set up assumptions such as a common reference string (CRS), or a public-
key infrastruction (PKI). An interesting parallel line of research is to determine the minimal set-
up assumptions necessary for realizing the Ideal Commitment functionality (or other complete
functionalities) in the adaptive, UC model.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Coin Tossing
A.1 The Attack of [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993]
Cleve and Impagliazzo [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993] showed that any coin-tossing protocol in the
fail-stop model with respect to computationally unbounded adversaries, has bias at least 
(1=
p
r).
Since the details will be necessary for our analysis, we describe the [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993]
result in greater detail in the following. Let  = (A;B) be a coin-tossing protocol and let RA and
RB denote the random tapes used by A and B. Let W = [w1; w2; : : : ; w2r] denote the messages
that are sent when (A;B) is executed (at round i, A sends w2i 1 to B and B sends w2i to A).
Let  = (RA; RB) be the output of (A;B) when run to completion. Define 1;2; : : : ;2r
as follows. For i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; rg, 2i 1 is the output of B when A quits right before sending its
message in round i, and 2i is the output of A when B quits right before sending its message in
round i. Note that all these quantities are functions of (RA; RB).
Define the random variables P0; P1; : : : ; P2r as follows: For j 2 f0; 1; : : : ; 2rg,
Pj(RA; RB) = E(R0A;R
0
B)
[(R0A; R
0
B) jWj ]:
whereWj = [w1; : : : ; wj ] are the first j messages. Intuitively, Pj is the expected final value of the
protocol conditioned on the values of the first j messages exchanged by the parties. We stress that
Pj(RA; RB) = Pj(R
0
A; R
0
B) for all pairs (RA; RB); (R
0
A; R
0
B) that define the same first j messages.
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In [Cleve and Impagliazzo, 1993] it is proved that with probability greater than 1=5, there exists
a j 2 f1; : : : ; 2rg, such that jPj   Pj 1j > 132p2r . Define the random variables Q1; : : : ; Q2r as
follows:
Qj(RA; RB) = ER0A;R
0
B
[j(R
0
A; R
0
B) jWj 1]:
where Wj 1 = [w1; : : : ; wj 1] are the first j   1 messages. Intuitively, Qj is the expected value
output by the other party if one party quits right afterwj 1 was sent, conditioned on the values of the
first j 1messages exchanged by the parties. As with Pj , we have thatQj(RA; RB) = Qj(R0A; R0B)
for all pairs (RA; RB); (R0A; R
0
B) that define the same first j   1 messages. We alternatively define
Qj in the following way, which we will use in our analysis:
Qj(RA; RB) = ER0A;R
0
B
[j(R
0
A; R
0
B) jWj ]:
whereWj = [w1; : : : ; wj ] are the first j messages. Note that the difference in our alternate definition
is that we condition over the j-th message wj as well as the first j 1messages. Since j(RA; RB)
is independent of the j-th message, we have that for all (RA; RB), ER0A;R0B [j(R
0
A; R
0
B) j Wj ] =
ER0A;R
0
B
[j(R
0
A; R
0
B) jWj 1]: Thus, the two definitions are equivalent.
Since, for all j 2 f1; : : : ; 2rg; jPj   Qj j + jQj   Pj 1j  jPj   Pj 1j, we may express the
event that there exists a j 2 f1; : : : ; 2rg such that jPj   Pj 1j > 132p2r as the union of these eight
events:
GA;0 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i 1  Q2i 1 > 164p2r HA;0 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i 2  Q2i 1 >
1
64
p
2r
GA;1 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i 1  Q2i 1 <   164p2r HA;1 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i 2  Q2i 1 <  
1
64
p
2r
GB;0 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i  Q2i > 164p2r HB;0 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i 1  Q2i >
1
64
p
2r
GB;1 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i  Q2i <   164p2r HB;1 : 9i 2 [r] s.t. P2i 1  Q2i <  
1
64
p
2r
Since Pr[GA;0 _ GA;1 _ GB;0 _ GB;1 _ HA;0 _ HA;1 _ HB;0 _ HB;1] > 15 ; at least one of these
eight events must occur with probability greater than 140 . Suppose Pr[GA;1] >
1
40 . Then consider
the following adversarial bA: simulate A until a round i occurs where P2i 1   Q2i 1 <   164p2r in
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which case quit.
Now, when (bA;B) is executed, it follows that:
Pr
(RA;RB)
[b = 1 j (ajb) hbA;Bi] > 1
2
+
1
40
 1
64
p
2r
(A.1.1)
Intuitively, this holds because with probability 1=40 one of the necessary events must hold, and in
such a case the adversary biases the outcome by 1=64
p
2r.
Observe that in order to carry out this “attack”, the adversary bA must be able to compute all of
the Pi and Qi probabilities (in order to find a round in which the difference occurs). However, it
appears that this computation cannot be carried out efficiently, implying that a ppt bA cannot carry
out the attack. (If bA could be implemented efficiently then this would contradict the existence of
oblivious transfer because by [Moran et al., 2009] it is possible to limit the bias to O(1=r) under
this assumption.)
A.2 The Independence Learner of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]
In this section we show how to prove Lemma 3.3.3 which is implicit in [Barak and Mahmoody,
2009] by deducing it from the results explicitly proved there.
We will use the results of Section 4 of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]. We first need to clarify the
renaming of the parameters. Here we usem to denote the number of oracle queries by Alice and Bob
whereas it is denoted by n there (we saved n for the security parameter of the one-way function).
What we call as  in this paper is equal to =n in [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] which would in fact
be equal to =m in our terms. Namely,  is the input parameter in [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009],
but we prefer to take =m =  as the input parameter.
We need to define some events and distributions used in [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] which
matter to us. At any point during the protocol where Eve is done with her learning algorithm for that
round, let W be the messages sent so far, and let I be Eve’s knowledge about the random oracle.
The notation EXEC(M; I) is used in [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] to denote what we called here
AB which is the joint distribution over Alice and Bob’s views so far conditioned on (M; I). The
event Good(M; I) is defined over EXEC(M; I) as follows. Let (A;B) be an instance of the space
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EXEC(M; I). Then we say that Good(M; I) holds over (A;B) iff Q(A) \ Q(B)  Q(I); namely
Alice and Bob do not have any “private” query in common out ofQ(I). The event Fail defined over
a complete execution of the system is equal to the event that Q(A) \ Q(B)  Q(I) is violated at
any point during the execution. Note that the event :Good implies that Fail has already happened.
The independence learner given the parameter  can be described in two lines as follows (see
Section 3 of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]):
As long as there exists a query q 62 Q(I) such that Pr(A;B) EXEC(M;I)[q 2 Q(A) [Q(B)]  
then ask q from the oracle and add q paired with its answer to I .
Security of the Learner. The distributions bA and bB are the same as the product distributions
defined in Lemma 7 in [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]. It is proved in Lemma 8 of [Barak and
Mahmoody, 2009] that the statistical distance between bA  bB and GEXEC(M; I) (which is the
same as AB j Good(M; I)) is at most O() which is equal to O(m) in our terms. But we are not
done yet about proving the security property of the learner, because the event :Good(M; I) can
still increase the statistical distance between bA  bB and AB. We will show that with probability
at least 1   O(p) = 1   O(pm) it holds that Pr[Good]  1   O(pm). But before showing
the latter claim, note that the statistical distance between GEXEC(M; I) and bA  bB is at most
O() = O(m) < 1=2 (by Lemma 8 of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009]) and therefore if any query
q 62 Q(I) has chance at most  of being in Q(A) [ Q(B) for (A;B)  GEXEC(M; I), it also has
chance at most 2 to be in Q(bA) [Q(bB) (which can be made  by rescaling  by a factor of 2).
Now we use Lemma 4 of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] which proves that Pr[Fail]  O() =
O(m). Lemma 9 of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] which was originally proved in [Impagliazzo
and Rudich, 1989] (as Lemma 6.4) informally speaking proves that elementary average arguments
generalize to an online setting as well. Namely, Pr[Fail]  O(m) implies that with probability
1 O(pm) over the execution of the system, it holds at all time during the execution of the system
that the probability of Fail happening at some point before conditioned on the current (M; I) is at
most O(
p
m). Note that PrEXEC(M;I)[Fail]  PrEXEC(M;I)[:Good], which finishes the proof of
the security property. It is also easy to see that by making the value of  smaller, it only can decrease
the probability of Fail and thus improve the security property.
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Efficiency of the Learner. In Lemma 11 of [Barak and Mahmoody, 2009] it is proved that up to
an event Bad of probability at most O() = O(m), the expected number of queries asked by the
learning algorithm is at most O(m2=) = O(m=). So if we stop the learning after the Bad event
happens we might loose the security of the learner by at most O(m)  O(pm) which is still fine
and yet we preserve the required efficiency. All that is needed in the proof of the efficiency is that
whenever Eve asks a query while the event Bad has not happened this query is using the threshold
parameter at most . So if we use larger values for  we still preserve the efficiency with respect to
parameter .
Robustness of the Learner. The proof of Robustness was discussed above along proving the
Security and the Efficiency properties.
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